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THE SUFFICIENCY OF UNCORROBORATED HEARSAY
IN ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS: THE
CALIFORNIA RULE*
If we are to continue a government of limited powers these agencies of
regulation must themselves be regulated. The limits of their power over
the citizen must be fixed and determined. The rights of the citizen
against them must be made plain.
-Elihu Root (1916)1
I. INTRODUCTION
It has been almost sixty years since Elihu Root delivered his pro-
phetic address to the American Bar. The "crude and imperfect" pro-
cedures of a "system of administrative law" then in its "infancy" have
to a large extent improved. The heated debate seems to be over;2 the
administrative process is upon us and the "extravagant version of the
rule of law" has yielded to a more modest and limited brand of "discre-
tionary justice."'3  Due process has remained the legal bulwark; its new
* I would like to thank Kenyon F. Dobberteen, Legal Aid Foundation of Los
Angeles, and Christopher N. May, Associate Dean and Professor of Law, Loyola Uni-
versity of Los Angeles Law School, for their thoughtful remarks on an earlier draft of
this Comment. It is out of a sense of gratitude that one sometimes has reservations
about printing a Comment as lengthy as this one, if only because of the possibility that
it may be taken by some to reflect ill upon those to whom it otherwise acknowledges
its indebtedness.
1. Root, Public Service by the Bar, 41 A.B.A. REP. 355, 369 (1916) (emphasis
added). The impact of administrative law upon the democratic process has received a
more favorable evaluation in recent years. See K. DAvis, Am tismAm LAw TExT 1-
52 (1972) [hereinafter cited as ADm-sTATVE LAw TEXr]; J. FRANK, IF MEN Wm
ANGELS 19-20 (1942); W. GELLHORN, WHEN AmEru Ns COMPLArN (1966); R. LoRCH,
DEMOCRATIc PRocEss Am AmmISTRATVE LAw 95-114 (1969) [hereinafter cited as
LORcH]; C. PoUND, J. KuRTz & C. NAGEL, THE GROWTH OF ADmNISTRATIVE LAW 106-10,
135 (1923); R. PoUND, ADmmsTRAwE LAw (1942); J. ROSENFARB, FREEDOM AND THE
ArmmntSATmvn STATE (1948); Jones, The Role of Administrative Agencies as Instru-
ments of Social Reform, 19 AD. L. REv. 279 (1967); Miller, Administrative Decision
Making-Mortal or Immortal?, 25 HASTINGS L.J. 1131 (1974); Newman, Two Decades
of Administrative Law in California: A Critique, 44 CALiF. L. REV. 190 (1956). But cf.
W. DOUGLAS, Go EAST YOUNG MAN 297, 303-07, 315 (1974); H. WHEELER, DEM OcRAcY
IN A REVOLUTONARY ERA 79-101 (1970); Freedman, Crisis and Legitimacy in the
Administrative Process, 27 STAN. L. REv. 1041 (1975); Waters, State of the State, Los
Angeles Daily J., May 15, 1975, at 3, col. 1.
2. K.C. DAvis, DiscRETONARY JUSTICE 27-51 (1969).
3. Id. at 1-26. The extravagant version of the rule of law attempted to root out all
traces of discretionary power-this version of the rule operated in a world of absolutes.
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enemies are "unnecessary discretion" and "abusive discretion."4  With
the advent of "discretionary justice," the courts have become more ac-
tive in checking administrative abuses. This very decade has witnessed
the genesis of what has come to be known as the "due process revolu-
tion," and with that revolution arose a "new concern with and scrutiny
of the administrative process." 5  The tenor of the landmark 1970 due
process decisions' was thought by many to signal the fulfillment of a
legal prophecy-a prelude of things to come.7  Implicit in the man-
date of these decisions was the belief that the rights of the citizen could
be made "plain," thereby affording a safety check against the abuses
of unnecessary discretion."
In our system of federalism, the states are relied upon to prescribe
local administrative regulations; sometimes their policies retain a cau-
tious distance from the earthshaking innovations of the general govern-
ment or even the celestial movement of administrative bureaucracy at
the regulatory agency level.9 It is within that ambit of the law that
old problems have a way of reappearing, even if in the guise of seem-
ingly novel issues. What follows, then, commences an inquiry into an
almost ancient legal issue now refined with a few new twists.
This Comment concerns itself with the evidentiary status of certain
California administrative procedures. More specifically, this examina-
tion concentrates upon the sufficiency of uncorroborated hearsay in ad-
ministrative proceedings. Accordingly, consideration will be allotted to
the general issues of the overall role and regulation of hearsay evidence
in California administrative law. To that end, emphasis will be placed
on the historical development of decisional, judicial, and administrative
"Discretionary justice," on the other hand, set out to limit or check only unnecessary
discretion-this brand of justice operated on the premise that flexibility could be made
compatible with fairness. See id. at 15-25.
4. See K.C. DAvis, DISCRETioNARY JUsTICE 3-26 (1969). See also Stewart, The Ref-
ormation of American Administrative Law, 88 HARv. L. Rnv. 1669, 1671-1711 (1975).
5. Carrow, Administrative Justice Comes of Age, 60 A.B.A.J. 1390, 1396 (1974).
6. Wheeler v. Montgomery, 397 U.S. 280 (1970); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254
(1970).
7. See, e.g., Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972) (parole revocation); Fuentes v.
Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972) (replevin action); Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535 (1971)
(driver's license suspension); Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433 (1971) (liquor
sale prohibition).
8. Since the protection granted was of a constitutional dimension, its sweep extended
to the state levels as well. See Wheeler v. Montgomery, 397 U.S. 280 (1970); pt.
V infra.
9. See T-m COMPLETE JEFFERSON 134-37 (S. Padover ed. 1943). For an insightful
discussion of the "decentralizing process" and its relationship to representative govern-
rent, see generally D. SIssoN, THE AMERIcAN REvoLuTIoN OF 1800 at 58 passim (1974).
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law germane to the central issue. The format chosen will include a
statement of the present status of the applicable law in California, along
with a discussion of the relevant evidentiary burdens, and an exposition
of the state of the law regulating the adequacy of hearsay evidence in
the administrative context. Having established the foundations of the
respective California law, certain criticisms of the major tenets of it
will be offered in order to permit a more exacting evaluation of some
of the elusive aspects of the particular inquiry. Thereafter, the focus
of the inquiry will shift to a consideration of the constitutional dimen-
sion of the administrative hearsay question. Finally, various California
procedures will be evaluated in light of certain suggested modifications
and alternative options.
II. BuRDENs: WINCH ONES AND How THEY APPLY
When evidentiary issues arise in administrative proceedings, the par-
ticular application of the respective burdens will, to a great extent, af-
fect the outcome of the case under consideration. Consequently, it is
important that the applicable burdens be clearly defined and properly
applied. The burden of proof is best viewed as consisting of two dis-
tinct elements-the burden of producing evidence and the burden of
persuasion.10
Essentially, the burden of producing evidence refers to the burden
of "going forward with the evidence or introducing some evidence on
an issue."" At this stage, there is no burden to prove a fact; all that
is necessary is that the evidence be sufficient to "avoid an adverse rul-
ing on the issue involved.' The rule only requires that some "believ-
able evidence" be introduced. 13 What this means is that "[a] party
satisfies the burden of producing evidence by introducing evidence suf-
ficient to sustain a finding in his favor on the issue involved."' 4  The
burden of persuasion, on the other hand, requires a party to "convince
the trier of fact . . . of the existence or nonexistence of that fact" by
the degree of proof required.Y5
10. 1 F. CooPER, STATE ADmINISTRATrVE LAW 355 (1965) [hereinafter cited as
COOPER]. This evidentiary scheme derives from, but is not mandated by, the California
Evidence Code. See CAL. EviD. CODE §§ 110, 115 (West 1970); note 57 infra.
11. B. JEFFERSON, CALIFoRNIA EVIDENCE_ BENcnnooK 780 (1972) [hereinafter cited as
JEFFERSON] (emphasis added).
12. Id.
13. Id. at 781.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 777-78 (emphasis added).
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The allocation of burdens depends upon the type of case before the
agency. For example,
[tihe state courts quite uniformly impose on agencies the customary
common-law rule that the moving party has the burden of proof, in-
cluding not only the burden of going forward but also the burden of per-
suasion. This means, of course, that when an applicant appears before
an agency seeking to establish a claim or obtain a license, the burden is
on him. Conversely, when the agency is the moving party, the burden
is on it.16
The analytical process of distinguishing the two burdens is somewhat
complicated by the fact that "the initial burden to produce evidence
is on the party having the burden of [persuasion] as to [a particular]
fact or issue."' 7 This "coincidence of the two burdens"' 8 requires the
hearing officer to first determine which party has the burden of persua-
sion so as to establish the respective burdens of production."9 As pre-
viously noted,20 the burden of proof will generally lie with the "moving
party."' 21  Once this has been established, the moving party need only
offer some evidence capable of sustaining a favorable finding on the
issue involved;22 the burden of production will thereafter shift to the
opponent.28 However, the burden does not shift where the evidence
16. 1 CoOPER, supra note 10, at 355 (footnotes omitted).
17. JEFFERSON, supra note 11, at 792.
18. Id. (emphasis deleted).
19. Id.
20. See text accompanying note 15 supra.
21. See CALiFoRNA ADmNISTRATVE AGENCY PRACTICE 183-84 (M. Nestle ed. 1970)
[hereinafter cited as ADmimSgT AGENCY PRAcrIcE]; 1 COOPER, supra note 10, at
355; A trmsm-rATrvn LAw TMXr, supra note 1, at 287; 2 K. DAvIS, ADMINIsTRATIvE LAW
TREATISE 326 (1958) [hereinafter cited as ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATSE]; W.
DEEnING, CALrFoRN A AmD Tis rmv' MANDAmus 49 (1966) [hereinafter cited as
ADMImSTRATwE MANDAmus]; C. KUCHMAN, CALiFORN ADMINSTRATnvE LAW AND
PROCEDURE 127 (1953); 4 B. JONES, JONES ON EVIDENCE: CvIL AND CRIMINAL 339-42
(S. Garded ed. 1972) [hereinafter cited as JONES]; C. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK OF THE
LAW OF EviDENccE 853 (E. Cleary ed. 1972) [hereinafter cited as McCoRMIckj]; B.
WrruN, CALIFORNIA EViDENcE 28 (2d ed. 1966) [hereinafter cited as WrrKN]; 2 CAL.
JuR. 3d Administrative Law 412-13 (1973); cf. CAL. LABOR CODE ANN. § 5705 (West
1971). A relaxation of this rule in the claimant's favor may be found in Kerner v.
Fleeming, 283 F.2d 916, 922 (2d Cir. 1960).
Two appellate decisions have held that where evidence as to discrimination is offered,
in those cases, "[ilt is within the discretion of the hearing officer to determine the order
of the proof." Feist v. Rowe, 3 Cal. App. 3d 404, 412, 83 Cal. Rptr. 465, 470 (1970)
(emphasis added); Ehrlich v. Connell, 214 Cal. App. 2d 280, 287, 29 Cal. Rptr. 283, 288
(1963).
22. JEFFERSON, supra note 11, at 780.
23. Id. at 793.
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offered is not "sufficient in itself to support a finding. 24 Consequently,
unless expressly provided for by statute, an offer of certain kinds
of evidence cannot sustain the moving party's burden of production,
thereby preventing that party from meeting the required burden of per-
suasion.2 5 (Here the issue pertains to the sufficiency of the evidence
rather than to its admissibility.)
The rationale of these rules is that a person should not be deprived
of a legally protected interest until such time as another party, legally
empowered to divest that person of that interest, has established a
prima facie case as required under the applicable laws. License revo-
cation and administrative disciplinary cases exemplify the procedural
guarantees required where the deprivation of a vested interest" is
threatened.
The California rule in license revocation cases thus requires that the
party asserting revocation or suspension of the holder's license come
forward with evidence of a kind sufficient to sustain a finding, and that
revocation may issue only on a showing of "good cause. '27  Absent this
24. CAL. Gov'T CODE ANN. § 11513(c) (West Supp. 1975); see Walker v. City of San
Gabriel, 20 Cal. 2d 879, 881, 129 P.2d 349, 351 (1942); id. at 882, 129 P.2d at 351
(Traynor, J., concurring); La Prade v. Department of Water & Power, 27 Cal. 2d 47, 51,
162 P.2d 13, 15 (1945).
25. See note 24 supra.
26. The standard definition of the phrase provides:
An interest when vested, whether it entitles the owner to the possession now or
at a future period, is fixed and present; so that the right of ownership, to the extent
of the estate, may be aliened.
BALLENINr 'S LAW DiCTONARY 1339 (1969), citing Allison v. Allison's Ex'rs, 44 S.E.
904 (Va. 1903). Where the interest has the legal status of a right, California courts
have held:
'The term 'vested right' is often loosely used. In one sense every right is vested.
If a man has a right at all, it must be vested in him . . . . The term, however,
is frequently used to designate a right which has become so fixed that it is not sub-
ject to be divested without the consent of the owner, as contra-distinguished from
rights which are subject to be divested without his consent."
Adoption of Graham, 58 Cal. 2d 899, 905, 377 P.2d 275, 279, 27 Cal. Rptr. 163, 167
(1962), quoting Stohr v. San Francisco Musical Fund Soc'y, 82 Cal. 557, 560, 22 P.
1125, 1126 (1890). See note 27 infra.
27. Walker v. City of San Gabriel, 20 Cal. 2d 879, 881, 129 P.2d 349, 351 (1942)
(revocation of a license to conduct a wrecking business); note 77 infra; see La Prade v.
Department of Water & Power, 27 Cal. 2d 47, 51, 162 P.2d 13, 16 (1945) (discharge of
civil service employee); Sunseri v. Board of Medical Examiners, 224 Cal. App. 2d 309,
317, 36 Cal. Rptr. 553, 558 (1964) (suspension of physician's license); Vaughn v. Board
of Police Comm'rs, 59 Cal. App. 2d 771, 780-81, 140 P.2d 130, 135 (1943) (license
revocation). The question of "competent evidence" generally goes to the issue of the
admissibility of certain kinds of evidence. The concern is not with the amount of evi-
dence, but rather with the kind of evidence presented. See ADMNImSTATIvE AoENCY
PRAcTicE, supra note 21, at 155-56, 158-60; id. at 16-17 (Supp. 1973); LORCH, supra
note 1, at 132-39; WrrnI, supra note 21, at 25-28, 31-33; id. at 4-5 (2d ed. Supp. 1974).
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requisite showing, there cannot exist an adversary hearing sufficient to
warrant a decision. Until the moving party establishes a prima facie
case with sufficient evidence, the party adversely affected may right-
fully claim that "there [is] no evidence to rebut."2  Although this has
been the rule in license revocation and employee discharge-suspension
cases,2" the courts have been consistent in holding that in application
cases the applicant bears the burden of proof.8 0 Furthermore, there
While the requisite showing of "good cause" is not identical with the "sufficiency"
requirement, nevertheless, it operates to assure the credibility of certain evidence. This
showing not only lends support to the propriety of an agency's findings, but ensures due
process guarantees:
In order to revoke a license the board obviously must examine the facts, resolve
any conflicts in the evidence, and exercise its judgment with respect thereto. A
revocation may be only "for good cause" and, accordingly, the board must afford
an opportunity for a full hearing, an essential element of a quasi judicial proceeding
This does not mean, of course, that the "discretion" given to the board is
absolute, since it must be exercised in accordance with the law.
Covert v. State Bd. of Equalization, 29 Cal. 2d 125, 131, 173 P.2d 545, 548 (1946)
(emphasis added) (hearing to revoke an "on sale" liquor license).
In much the same manner, this rule emerges in disciplinary proceedings:
It may be conceded that in disciplinary administrative proceedings the burden of
proof is upon the party asserting the affirmative ...and that [a finding of] guilt
cannot be based on surmise, conjecture, suspicion or theoretical conclusions, or un-
corroborated hearsay.
Cornell v. Reilly, 127 Cal. App. 2d 178, 183-84, 273 P.2d 572, 576 (1954) (revocation
of liquor license).
28. Walker v. City of San Gabriel, 20 Cal. 2d 879, 882, 129 P.2d 349, 351 (1942)
(Traynor, J., concurring). Other courts have noted:
In any proceeding of this character, evidence must be adduced to sustain the charges.
It is not incumbent on the employee to proceed. The burden does not rest on him
to refute the charges made.
La Prade v. Department of Water & Power, 27 Cal. 2d 47, 51, 162 P.2d 13, 15 (1945).
29. See La Prade v. Department of Water & Power, 27 Cal. 2d 47, 51, 162 P.2d 13, 16
(1945) (discharge of civil service employee); Sunseri v. Board of Medical Examiners,
224 Cal. App. 2d 309, 317, 36 Cal. Rptr. 553, 558 (1964) (suspension of a physician's
license); note 10 supra.
30. Southern Cal. Jockey Club, Inc. v. California Horse Racing Bd., 36 Cal. 2d 167,
177, 223 P.2d 1, 7 (1950) (application for horse racing license); Savelli v. Board of
Medical Examiners, 229 Cal. App. 2d 124, 134, 40 Cal. Rptr. 171, 177 (1964), cert.
denied, 380 U.S. 934 (1965) (applicant failed to prove that he met the statutory
conditions precedent to having the right to take an examination); 1 CooPeR, supra note
10, at 355-56; ADMmnsTRATrv LAw TExT, supra note 1, at 287. It has been pointed out
that
[tihe burden of proof is always upon any applicant for any license, unless by stat-
ute the burden is shifted. In short, the burden of proof is upon the party undertak-
ing an affirmative action of any sort through an adjudicatory proceeding, except
where the statute provides otherwise.
Lorcir, supra note 1, at 131; see 2 PiKE & FISHm, ADMINISTRATIE LAW 53-67 (2d ed.
H. Fischer and I. Wills eds. 1965); id. at 33-43 (1970 Supp.).
The application of this doctrine also occurs in the judicial review setting. Strum-
sky v. San Diego County Employees Retirement Ass'n, 11 Cal. 3d 28, 44-45, 520
P.2d 29, 40, 112 Cal. Rptr. 805, 816 (1974); Bixby v. Pierno, 4 Cal. 3d 130, 143-47, 481
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is case law to the effect that if a license is renewable merely upon pay-
ment of a fee, or some similar activity, and no further showing is re-
quired, the licensee is under no burden to prove any additional mat-
ters.3 Such holdings afford maximum protection to the holder of a
right, even after the express duration of that right has expired. The
license renewal cases are noteworthy examples of how far the courts
will go to extend the burden of proof rule in order to guarantee sub-
stantial justice to the party adversely affected.
Another class of cases in which the burden of proof rule is invoked
are those cases involving administrative disciplinary proceedings. 82
Thus where the dismissal is of a police officer,83 civil service employ-
ee,34 or a school teacher who is not reinstated because of the lapse of
a teaching credential, 5 the general rule remains that the party asserting
the affirmative action has the burden of proof.
8 6
The license and disciplinary cases illustrate that the burden of proof
will properly lie with the applicant but never with the party threatened
by termination, suspension, revocation, or renewal proceedings.8 T
Consequently, in all of these proceedings, the primary focus is on the
party who stands to lose a vested interest.88 Furthermore, this require-
ment is most vital in those cases which involve the essentials of life.89
P.2d 242, 251-54, 93 Cal. Rptr. 234, 243-46 (1971); C. KucHmAN, CALIFOrtN
ADMINISTRATIvE LAW AND PROCEDURE 188-95 (1953). The same distinction can be found
at the federal level. See Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 402 (1971); Goldberg v.
Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 261, 267, 269 (1970).
31. Hall v. Scudder, 74 Cal. App. 2d 433, 436-38, 168 P.2d 990, 992-93 (1946)
(application for renewal of a real estate license). In Hall, the court observed:
None of the procedure which is applicable to the matter of original applications,
and none of that which must be followed before there can be an order of suspension
or revocation is expressly, or at all, made applicable to proceedings for renewal of
licenses.
Id. at 436, 168 P.2d at 992.
32. See, e.g., Cornell v. Reilly, 127 Cal. App. 2d 178, 183-84, 273 P.2d 572, 576
(1954).
33. Martin v. State Personnel Bd., 26 Cal. App. 3d 573, 582, 103 Cal. Rptr. 306, 311-
12 (1972) (dismissal of prison correction officer); Johnstone v. City of Daly City, 156
Cal. App. 2d 506, 515, 319 P.2d 756, 762 (1958) (dismissal of police inspector).
34. Steen v. City of Los Angeles, 31 Cal. 2d 542, 547, 190 P.2d 937, 940 (1948); La
Prade v. Department of Water & Power, 27 Cal. 2d 47, 51, 162 P.2d 13, 15-16 (1945).
35. Mass v. Board of Educ., 61 Cal. 2d 612, 619-20, 394 P.2d 579, 584, 39 Cal. Rptr.
739, 744 (1964).
36. See note 10 supra.
37. See notes 10, 29, 30, 32, 33, 34 & 35 supra.
38. See note 26 supra.
39. See McCullough v. Terzian, 2 Cal. 3d 647, 653-54, 470 P.2d 4, 7, 87 Cal. Rptr.
195, 198 (1970). Similar statements can be found in the opinions of the Supreme Court.
See, e.g., Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254,
[Vol. 8
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Certain procedures have been established under California law
which enumerate the specific course of administrative adjudication to
be followed. The California Administrative Procedure Act (APA)40
provides the evidentiary procedures to be followed by the agencies af-
fected.41 However, it does not provide for a specific set of rules regu-
lating the burden of proof in administrative hearings. Since the burden
of proof requirement has been settled by case law,42 the absence of
an express statutory rule poses no problems of consequence. Those
rules apply whether or not the proceeding is affected by the APA,'5
unless otherwise expressly provided for by statute."
All burden of proof questions necessarily require a showing of the
requisite quantum of proof. The quantum of proof necessary to pre-
vail in an administrative action varies with the kind of case under con-
sideration. In only limited proceedings (e.g., criminal), however, is
the "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard invoked.45  Generally, ab-
sent specific statutory pronouncements, the "preponderance of the evi-
dence" test will apply where the proceeding is civil in nature.46 Where
the proceeding involves the disciplining of licensees, some courts have
held that "convincing proof to reasonable certainty" is required.
4 7
While certain procedures have been fashioned for particular proceed-
ings, such as Worker's Compensation cases, 48 nevertheless, the "pre-
264 (1970). In Dandridge, Justice Stewart, writing for the majority, noted: "The admin-
istration of public welfare assistance ... involves the most basic economic needs of
impoverished human beings ..... Id. at 485; see id. at 508, 522 (Marshall, J.,
dissenting).
40.-See CAL. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 11371 et seq. (West 1966).
41. See id. § 11501 (West Supp. 1975).
42. See notes 10, 28-29, 32-34 supra.
43. See CAL. Gov'T CODE ANN. § 11500 (West Supp. 1975).
44. Bertch v. Social Welfare Dep't, 45 Cal. 2d 524, 527, 289 P.2d 485, 487 (1955);
Serenko v. Bright, 263 Cal. App. 2d 682, 690, 70 Cal. Rptr. 1, 6 (1968); CAL. Gov'T
CODE ANN. § 11513 (West 1975); CAL. WELF. & INST'NS CODE ANN. § 10955 (West
1972).
45. Webster v. Board of Dental Examiners, 17 Cal. 2d 534, 538, 110 P.2d 992, 994
(1941); Realty Projects, Inc. v. Smith, 32 Cal. App. 3d 204, 212-13, 108 Cal. Rptr. 71,
77 (1973) (dictum).
46. Perales v. Department of Human Resources Dev., 32 Cal. App. 3d 332, 340-41,
108 Cal. Rptr. 167, 173 (1973); Pereyda v. State Personnel Bd., 15 CaL App. 3d 47, 52,
92 Cal. Rptr. 746, 749 (1971); 4 JoNEs, supra note 11, at 337.
47. Realty Projects, Inc. v. Smith, 32 Cal. App. 3d 204, 212, 108 Cal. Rptr. 71, 77
(1973); cf. Furman v. State Bar, 12 Cal. 2d 212, 229, 83 P.2d 12, 21 (1938).
48. See note 122 infra. Some courts have found the appropriate standard to be "that
degree of certainty upon which men may reasonably act, and by which their affairs may
reasonably be determined." Engels Copper Mining Co. v. Industrial Accident Comm'n,
183 Cal. 714, 717, 192 P. 845, 846 (1920); West v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 79 Cal.
1975]
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ponderance of the evidence" test is likely to be invoked absent compel-
ling considerations which require otherwise.49
The importance of the burden of proof issue is that it establishes
a firm foundation for an initial, and perhaps final, determination of the
priorities in the case. Where the kind or degree of evidence necessary
to sustain the allegations is lacking, the burden may not be satisfied.
In such instances, compelling the non-moving party to affirmatively re-
but such evidence results in an improper shifting of the burden. "It
is not incumbent on [that party] to proceed."50  Unfortunately, it has
become the practice-certainly an erroneous one-for the non-moving
party to proceed with his or her evidence after the mere recitation of
any allegations.5' Rather than expediting matters, this practice serves
only to prolong consideration of the question until a reviewing court
rehears the particular legal issue. Where this practice does expedite
matters, it will most likely do so at the expense and to the detriment
of the party affected. A more practical approach could be imple-
mented by requiring a more exact standard for an early evalua-
tion of the moving party's case, thereby relieving all parties of the pres-
entation of unwarranted and unnecessary evidence. Accordingly,
where insufficient evidence alone is presented, the proceeding should
come to an end at that point.5 2 This practice could be triggered by the
App. 2d 711, 719, 180 P.2d 972, 977 (1947), citing City & County of San Francisco v.
Industrial Accident Comm'n, 183 Cal. 273, 283, 191 P. 26, 29 (1920). Other rules of a
similar nature have also been fashioned. See Cornell v. Reilly, 127 Cal. App. 2d 178,
183-84, 273 P.2d 572, 576 (1954); WrXlN, supra note 21, at 29-30. On the role of
"presumptions" in administrative proceedings, consult ADMINiSTRATIVE AGENCY PRAC-
TICE, supra note 21, at 185; 1 CooPER, supra note 10, at 359-61.
49. Perhaps some comment should be made as to the distinction between the "prepon-
derance of evidence" test and the "substantial evidence" standard. The former is the test
employed by the agency in the first instance; it regulates the quantum of proof required
to establish a prima facie case and is therefore properly labeled as a standard of proof.
The latter concerns itself with the sufficiency of the evidence for purposes of judicial
review; it is a standard of review.
50. La Prade v. Department of Water & Power, 27 Cal. 47, 51, 162 P.2d 13, 16
(1945).
51. Interview with Edward S. Mizrahi, Staff Attorney, Legal Aid Foundation of Los
Angeles, June 4, 1975.
52. This technique was employed in Walker v. City of San Gabriel, 20 Cal. 2d 879,
880, 882, 129 P.2d 349, 350-51 (1942). A 1958 Note on the "residuum rule" labeled
this practice as the "first" of "two stages" of the administrative hearing at which evidence
is evaluated:
The first demand for determining the probative value of incompetent evidence
arises when a party moves for the administrative equivalent of either an involuntary
dismissal or a directed verdict. These are motions which seek an order as a matter
of law. They maintain that the insufficiency of the adversary's case makes adminis-
trative weighing of the facts unnecessary. The success of these motions depends on
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agency's summary determination at that stage. 3 Such a formulation,
while it might appear a bit over-sophisticated-perhaps unduly tech-
nical-simply indicates that there is a practical difference between the
mere acknowledgment of the burden of proof (i.e., mere allegations)
and the satisfaction of that burden with legally sufficient evidence.
Thus the real problem is determining when and how that burden is
met.
"11. SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE
Traditionally, "the common-law 'jury-trial' or 'technical rules' " re-
garding the admissibility of evidence have not been strictly, if at all,
enforced in administrative proceedings. 54  The strict evidentiary pro-
cedures of the courtroom have been somewhat relaxed to permit a
more liberal application of the rules. 55 Apart from this relaxed tradi-
whether, as a matter of law, the party against whom the motion is made is directed
has presented a prima facie case. At this stage, the problem can be phrased in
terms of the extent to which, if at all, the prima facie case may be established by
incompetent evidence.
Note, The Residuum Rule and Appellate Fact Review: Marriage of Necessity, 13
RUTGFRS L. REv. 254-55 (1958) (footnote omitted); see note 177 infra.
53. Cf. text accompanying note 71 infra.
54. Englebretson v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 170 Cal. 793, 797-99, 151 P. 421,
422-23 (1915); Carroll v. Knickerbocker Ice Co., 113 N.E. 507, 508 (N.Y. 1916);
COOPER, supra note 10, at 379-80; 4 JoNEs, supra note 21, at 331-35; WrrKN, supra note
21, at 25. One commentator has noted:
The reason [why administrative agencies are not bound by the strict rules of evi-
dence] is one of expediency arising from the assumption that it is better to leave
such matters to practical experience in the special field of operation, and to com-
mon sense and discretion, than to expect an orderly application of evidence rules
from commissioners and the like who have no education and training in the law
of evidence.
4 Jones, supra note 21, at 332. But see 1 J. WIGMORE, A TREATIsE ON THE ANGLO-
AMucAN SYSTEM OF EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW 36 (1940) [hereinafter
cited as WIGMoRE]. The history and policy of the non-application of evidentiary rules in
administrative proceedings can be found at id. at 27-43. Professor Kenneth Culp Davis
has observed:
The direction of movement on evidence problems throughout the legal system, in
the judicial process as well as in the administrative process, is toward (1) replacing
rules with discretion, (2) admitting all evidence that seems to the presiding officer
relevant and useful, and (3) relying upon "the kind of evidence on which responsi-
ble persons are accustomed to rely in serious affairs."
2 ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATSE, supra note 21, at 250 (footnote omitted); see 1
COOPER, supra note 10, at 381. But see McCoRMICK, supra note 21, at 840. Addition-
ally, it should be noted that
[s]ince administrative hearings differ so widely in scope and significance, it is im-
possible to suggest a single standard to govern the admission of all evidence. It
is probably still true. . . that the more closely administrative proceedings approach
judicial proceedings in formality and in the nature of the issues to be tried the
greater the degree to which the exclusionary rules will be applied.
Id. at 843 (emphasis added).
55. ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCY PRACTICE, supra note 21, at 155-56.
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tion, standards of relevancy still remain. 56
California has adopted the traditional practice to the extent that the
provisions of the Evidence Code, unless otherwise provided for, are in-
applicable in administrative proceedings.57  Additionally, California
statutory law expressly provides that all agencies affected by the APA
are not bound by "the technical rules relating to evidence."5 8
The foregoing practice necessarily permits the admission of hearsay
evidence. "There [being] no reason for administrative bodies to be
more restrictive than courts . . . , evidence competent in judicial pro-
ceedings, including hearsay with an exception, is generally held compe-
tent in administrative proceedings."5 9  Even incompetent hearsay is
admissible. 60 The question turns on whether incompetent hearsay,"
without more, is sufficient to satisfy the moving party's burden and
thereby support the agency's findings. In order to avoid confusion, it
is important that the "admissibility" issue not be viewed in the same
light as the "sufficiency" standard; they are different creatures. Ad-
missibility is not the equivalent of evaluation; the former makes certain
concessions in the interest of full and complete discovery while the lat-
ter, in the interest of fairness, withholds legal sanction to evidence
found not to be trustworthy. Unlike the common practice in judicial
56. Id. at 156; 4 JONES, supra note 21, at 335-37; WrrmN, supra note 21, at 30-31.
57. "The provisions of the code do not apply to administrative proceedings ... unless
some statute so provides or the agency concerned chooses to apply them." CAL. EviD.
CODE § 300, Comment (West 1968).
58. CAL. Gov'T CODE ANN. § 11513(c) (West 1975) (emphasis added). Regarding
the "technical rules" of evidence, it has been observed:
A distinction, somewhat vague in its application, is sometimes drawn between rules
which are "essential" to justice and those which are merely "technical," and perhaps
it is more accurate to say that in administrative hearings the same rules apply as
in judicial tribunals but that the agency may "relax" the rules at discretion so long
as no party is seriously hurt by it ....
4 JoNEs, supra note 21, at 334-35 (footnotes omitted and emphasis added). Would the
deprivation of a "fundamental-vested right" which affects "the most basic economic needs
of impoverished human beings" be sufficiently serious to warrant a "tightening" of the
rules? ("[1It has been held that the hearsay rule is not a mere technical rule but is a basic
rule of exclusion to protect -the right of cross-examination." Id. at 343.)
59. Wrrmxr, supra note 21, at 31 (emphasis deleted). But see M. Foucoscu, A
TRFATISE ON ADmINISTRAT=V LAw 356-62 (1956); R. PARKER, ADMINISTRATVE LAW:
A TaxT 227-28 (1952).
60. CAL. Gov'T CoDE ANN. § 11513(c) (West 1975); ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCY
PRACTICE, supra note 21, at 158-60; LOAcH, supra note 1, at 133-37; WrrKIN, supra note
21, at 31-32. A worthwhile discussion of the distinction between the "admissibility of
evidence" and the "evaluation" of such can be found in McCoRMIcr, supra note 21, at
840-46.
61. Hearsay as used throughout this comment is meant to include only hearsay which
would be inadmissible over objection in a civil action.
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proceedings, the fact that evidence may be admissible does not there-
fore guarantee the sufficiency of such evidence to sustain a finding.
Consequently, evidence which is deemed admissible is generally con-
sidered to be "competent." On the other hand, evidence once ad-
mitted which is capable of sustaining a finding will amount to "suffi-
cient" evidence. Finally, determining what constitutes sufficient evi-
dence will depend upon the applicable judicial or statutory rule.
A. Decisional Law: The Walker Rule
It inevitably happens that the highest court of a state will render a
decision which will be cited to and relied upon extensively for several
decades. Unfortunately, notoriety does not favor serious scrutiny and
consideration of the facts and holding of such a case. Those decisions
affecting administrative tribunals have not been immune from this pe-
culiar occurrence-Walker v. City of San Gabriel62 illustrates this
point. Considering the impact of Walker on administrative law,6" the
time is long overdue for a critical discussion of the case, even if it
means breaking 'away from tradition.
Walker involved the revocation of a license to operate an auto-
wrecking business on the grounds of alleged misconduct in violation
of city ordinances. 64 After thirteen years in the business, petitioner
(Walker) "received notice that the city council proposed to revoke his
license." 65 At the commencement of the hearing, petitioner's attorney
informed the members of the council that "Mr. Walker stood ready,
able, and willing to produce evidence and testimony as to why his li-
cense should not be revoked, but should await -the evidence of why it
should be."66
Since this proceeding involved the revocation of a vested interest,
6 7
Walker's counsel stated his position to the board in order to serve no-
tice of his claim that the city as the moving party had the burden of
proof.6 8 After the opening remarks, a representative of the city (a
62. 20 Cal. 2d 879, 129 P.2d 349 (1942).
63. It is noted that Walker is not, strictly speaking, the precedent ruling in this area of
the law. For example, in Laterman v. Board of Medical Examiners, 4 Cal. App. 2d 319,
40 P.2d 913 (1935), the court, in a license revocation case, held that an administrative
board could not base its decision on inadmissible hearsay. Id. at 321, 40 P.2d at 914; see
note 81 infra.
64. 20 Cal. 2d at 880, 129 P.2d at 350.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. See note 26 supra.
68. In those cases which involve the deprivation of a vested right or interest, the
strategy invoked in Walker would be applicable.
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police officer) read a letter addressed to the board and "signed by the
chief of police of the city." 9  The letter recited several charges against
the petitioner to which no defense was offered other than to note
that until the persons making the complaints were produced, and an op-
portunity given to cross-examine them, there was no evidence before the
city council and nothing for the petitioner to refute. 70
For all practical purposes the proceeding then and there came to an
abrupt end. 71  The petitioner's refusal to produce any evidence on his
behalf, even though the city offered him a continuance, finally resulted
in the city's revocation of Walker's license. 2
On appeal it was argued that the revocation of the license, since it
was based on "hearsay evidence only," amounted to an arbitrary deci-
sion and therefore constituted an abuse of the council's discretion.'
The majority and concurring opinions addressed themselves to the issue
of whether or not mere hearsay evidence was sufficient to warrant the
board's revocation of the license.74 Simply stated, the court, in both
the majority75 and concurring opinions, 76 found that such evidence
standing alone was insufficient to support the deprivation of the inter-
est threatened. It made no difference to the court that the letter which
was read by a police officer was allegedly signed by the chief of po-
lice. In this regard, the court held that "[t]he letter was competent only
as a statement of the charges against the petitioner, but was not compe-
tent evidence of the truth of the charges stated therein.177  The con-
69. 20 Cal. 2d at 880, 129 P.2d at 350.
70. Id. (emphasis added).
71. See note 45 supra and accompanying text. The proceeding ended despite the fact
that the city offered a continuance to petitioner. See 20 Cal. 2d at 880, 129 P.2d at
350.
72. 20 Cal. 2d at 880, 129 P.2d at 350.
73. Id. at 881, 129 P.2d at 350.
74. In addition, the court considered whether certiorari or mandamus is an appropriate
remedy to test a board's alleged abuse of discretion, and whether or not uncorroborated
hearsay amounted to substantial evidence for the purposes of judicial review. Id. at 881-
85, 129 P.2d at 350-52.
75. Id. at 881, 120 P.2d at 351. Justice Shenk wrote the majority opinion, in which
Justices Curtis, Carter, and Peters concurred. On the issue of the adequacy of uncorro-
borated hearsay there was little or no difference between the majority and concurring
opinions.
76. Id. at 882, 129 P.2d at 351. Justice Traynor wrote the concurring opinion in which
Chief Justice Gibson and Justice Edmonds concurred.
77. Id. at 882, 129 P.2d at 351 (emphasis added). It should be noted that it is
doubtful that the Walker court was using the word "competent" as a term of art. Since
hearsay evidence is generally admissible in administrative proceedings (see text accompa-
nying notes 54-60 supra), the court's use of the term "competent" should be taken to
mean "sufficient." See note 27 supra.
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curring opinion referred to the letter "as a [mere] recital of the
charges."78
The lesson thus learned from Walker is that absent a statute provid-
ing otherwise, or the additional inclusion of non-hearsay evidence, un-
corroborated hearsay (i.e., hearsay inadmissible in a civil action79), at
least in revocation proceedings, does not amount to evidence sufficient
to sustain a finding. It is also worth noting that the holding found the
uncorroborated hearsay in the case to be nothing more than a mere
statement or recital of the charges; this the court found insufficient."'
The court by emphasizing the mere "recital" nature of the charges
demonstrated that something more was needed to satisfy the burden
of proof requirements. What is most novel about the Walker case,
however, is not so much the general holding,"1 but rather the context
78. 20 Cal. 2d at 882, 129 P.2d at 351 (Traynor, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
79. See 20 Cal. 2d at 882, 129 P.2d at 351 (Traynor, S., concurring); ADMiNISTRA-
TIVELAW TEXT, supra note 1, at 277.
80. 20 Cal. 2d at 882, 129 P.2d at 351.
81. The rule that uncorroborated hearsay is insufficient to support a decision is hardly
a new one. A variation of the rule was applied in an early California "Workmen's"
Compensation case-Englebretson v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 170 Cal. 793, 798-99,
151 P. 421, 422-23 (1915). Within less than one year a remarkably similar factual
setting produced a similar holding in the New York Court of Appeal's landmark case of
Carroll v. Knickerbocker Ice Co., 113 N.E. 507, 509 (N.Y. 1916). Both cases involved
claims under the "Workmen's" Compensation Law for deaths allegedly caused by injuries
within the scope of the deceaseds' employment. Likewise, in both cases there were
declarations by the deceaseds immediately prior to their deaths to the effect that the
injuries had been job related. On the basis of this evidence standing alone, the respective
commissions awarded the applied for benefits. The California Supreme Court, interpret-
ing the provisions of a 1913 "Workmen's" Compensation Insurance and Safety Act,
held: "There was no legal proof that the injury was accidental and the commission was
without the power to award compensation therefor." Englebretson v. Industrial Accident
Comm'n, 170 Cal. 793, 799, 151 P. 421, 423 (1915). (A good discussion of Englebretson
and the development of subsequent case law can be found in State Compensation Ins.
Fund v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 195 Cal. 174, 178-82, 231 P. 996, 998-99 (1924).)
There was simply no evidence sufficient to sustain the commission's award. 170 Cal. at
799, 151 P. at 423. The New York court, without citing Englebretson, fashioned a rule
based on the same principle which has come to be known as the "legal residuum rule."
That court held that uncorroborated hearsay was insufficient because "in the end there
must be a residuum of legal evidence to support the claim before an award can be made"
and "[s]uch hearsay testimony is no evidence." Carroll v. Knickerbocker Ice Co., 113
N.E. 507, 509 (N.Y. 1916).
For the present, it is worth noting that both Englebretson and Carroll involved
applications for benefits which arose within the Worker's Compensation setting, which
has since developed its own body of law separate and apart from other administrative
procedures. See notes 122-61 infra and accompanying text. A more in depth discussion
and analysis of the "legal residuum rule" can be found at pt. IV infra. A case history of
this rule prior to 1915 can be found in 1 P. BEqJAMIN, ADMINISTRATIVE ADJUDICATION
IN TIuE STATE OF NEw YoRK 182 (1942) [hereinafter cited as BENJAMIN].
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in which that court ruled as it did, given the practice employed by peti-
tioner's counsel (recall, the petitioner never offered any rebuttal evi-
dences).
A few years after Walker was decided the California Supreme Court
applied the Walker rule to several public employee discharge cases. In
Steen v. Board of Civil Service Commissioners,8 3 the court was con-
fronted with the discharge of a civil service employee based upon an
uncorroborated hearsay report submitted to the administrative board .
4
The hearsay consisted of an investigative report conducted by a man-
ager of the civil service department who was acting under an order of
the agency. 5 The court applied the rule "that in the absence of a spe-
cial statute an administrative agency cannot . . .make findings of fact
supported solely by hearsay evidence. '8 6 This rule was reaffirmed
again by the same court in the case of La Prade v. Department of
Water & Power.1
7
The case law established by the Walker, Steen, and La Prade hold-
ings thus preceded most statutory enactments regarding the sufficiency
of uncorroborated hearsay in administrative proceedings. These hold-
ings became the general rule in revocation and discharge cases while
the extension of the rule to "application" cases was more limited.8
82. 20 Cal. 2d 879, 880, 129 P.2d 349, 350 (1942). See text accompanying note 72
supra.
83. 26 Cal. 2d 716, 160 P.2d 816 (1945).
84. Id. at 725-26, 160 P.2d at 821-22.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 726-27, 160 P.2d at 822.
87. 27 Cal. 2d 47, 51, 162 P.2d 13, 15-16 (1945) (discharge of civil service em-
ployee). An example of the application of this rule in a non-APA setting can be
found in Armistead v. City of Los Angeles, 152 Cal. App. 2d 319, 324, 313 P.2d 127,
130 (1957) (demolition of private property ordered by municipality on the grounds that
it constituted a nuisance).
88. Desert Turf Club v. Board of Supervisors, 141 Cal. App. 2d 446, 455, 296 P.2d
882, 888 (1956) (denial of a permit to use land); Kinney v. Sacramento City Employees
Retirement Sys., 77 Cal. App. 2d 779, 782, 176 P.2d 775, 777 (1947) (application for
retirement allowance); see ADMINISTRATivF, AGENCY PRACTICE, supra note 21, at 161.
See generally Bixby v. Pierno, 4 Cal. 3d 130, 152, 481 P.2d 242, 258, 93 Cal. Rptr. 234,
(1971). This same principle was enunciated in Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 406
(1971). What this means is that the non-moving party can rebut the applicant's evidence
with uncorroborated hearsay. It does not, however, mean that the applicant can establish
his or her case with such evidence. Why should the non-moving party, when the burden
shifts to it, be able to meet that burden with uncorroborated hearsay evidence? Despite
the nature of the right involved, if the credibility of the evidence and the non-availabil-
ity of cross-examination are really the cornerstones of the rule, then, the rule should
apply with somewhat equal force to application cases.
By way of a brief digression from California law, it is worth noting that the case law
in New York parallels that followed by this state under the Walker rule. The New York
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B. Statutory Provisions: The California Administrative
Procedure Act
Several months after the Steen ruling was handed down, the legisla-
ture enacted California Government Code section 11513(c)89 which
provided specific evidentiary procedures applicable in certain adminis-
policy enunciated as early as 1916 (see note 81 supra) developed such that by 1942 (the
same year as Walker) it had become the general rule of law. The major case was
Stammer v. Board of Regents, 39 N.E.2d 913 (N.Y. 1942). The threatened suspension of
a physician's license was based on mere hearsay evidence. The Board's reliance upon
such evidence was held to be "arbitrary and baseless" where the applicable statute
required the ruling to be "founded upon sufficient legal evidence." Id. at 915. Thus, by
1966, the court in Leogrande v. State Liquor Authority, 268 N.Y.S.2d 433 (App. Div.
1966), rev'd on other grounds, 277 N.E.2d 302, 280 N.Y.S.2d 381 (1967), a license
revocation case, declared:
It is well established in this State that while hearsay evidence is admissible in an
administrative proceeding there must be some legal or competent evidence to sustain
the determination.
268 N.Y.S.2d at 438. This general rule has continued to win support in the courts. See
Del Valle v. Sugarman, 353 N.Y.S.2d 215 (App. Div. 1974); Sabatini v. Kirwan, 348
N.Y.S.2d 379 (App. Div. 1973); Schwartz, Administrative Law, 26 SYRACUSE L. Rav. 1,
4-5 (1975). Somewhat recently, the New York courts have extended this rule to other
agencies not traditionally affected by its mandate. For example, in Griffith v. Wyman,
333 N.Y.S.2d 703 (App. Div. 1972), the court considered hearsay statements offered by
the county in support of a reduction of AFDC grants to the petitioner. There the recipi-
ent had been charged with having received, endorsed, and cashed certain checks after
giving allegedly false statements that the original checks had been stolen, lost, or unde-
livered. At the hearing an agency official testified that the county's handwriting expert
had determined that the endorsements on the lost checks were the signatures of the peti-
tioner. Id. at 705. Regarding the probative value of the uncorroborated hearsay evidence,
the Griffith court stated: "Here, the hearsay evidence had such a harmful and unfair
effect as to vitiate the fairness of the hearing." Id.
The Griffith rationale was again invoked in the 1973 case of Martinez v. Sugarman,
345 N.Y.S.2d 63 (Sup. Ct. 1973) (see Schwartz, Administrative Law, 25 SYRAcusE L.
Rnv. 1, 8 (1974)). Martinez involved a petition to review the termination of AFDC
grants. At the "fair hearing," the state commissioner ruled that the petitioner failed to
explain the source of various monies received and spent. The only evidence introduced by
the New York City Department of Social Services was an "abstract" which stated the
allegations outlined in the county's case. This practice employed by the Department of
Social Services is not only a commonplace one, but, and more importantly, it is a prac-
tice which lends itself to precisely the criticism that the supreme court levied against the
city in Walker. See notes 76-78 supra and accompanying text. (Something more than an
absence of a "residuum of legal evidence" is involved where there is only a "statement,"
"recital," "abstract," or "outline" of the moving party's allegations.) On review the court
analyzed the probative value of the abstract: "mermination should not be allowed
when it is based largely on an abstract. Due process requires that the determination be
supported by more than hearsay evidence." 345 N.Y.S.2d at 64.
The Griffith and Martinez holdings exemplify the logical extension of the California
rule in license revocation and employee suspension-discharge cases. These cases bear an
essential identity to the case law which has evolved from Walker, except for the fact that
they involved public assistance grants.
89. Ch. 867, § 1, [1945] Cal. Stat. 1632.
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trative proceedings. 0° The traditional rule of liberal admissibility1 was
subject only to the limitation that the evidence be of the kind upon
"which responsible persons are accustomed to rely in the conduct of
serious affairs ... ."91 While the technical rules of evidence did not
apply, the statute specifically restricted the use of hearsay evidence. The
Code provides: "Hearsay evidence may be used for the purpose of
supplementing or explaining other evidence but shall not be suf-
ficient in itself to support a finding. . . ...3 The 1945 statutory en-
actment was essentially a restatement of the major tenets of the Walker
rule."4 The Code's provision that uncorroborated hearsay is insuffi-
cient "unless it would be admissible over objection in civil actions"05
in effect parallels the Walker mandate. 6
Most of the early appellate cases which interpreted section 11513 (c)
involved instances where hearsay evidence was used to supplement
other non-hearsay evidence. Thus, in Cooper v. State Board of Public
Health,97 a hearsay transcript was sufficient to revoke the license of
a clinical laboratory technologist where such evidence was used merely
to support findings based upon petitioner's own statements before the
board. 8 Similar license revocation cases, 99 including instances where
a hearsay report was adopted and vouched for at the hearing by the
declarant, have been held to be sufficient under section 11513(c). 00
On the other hand, other courts have narrowly applied the Code pro-
visions. For example, it has been held that the revocation of a physi-
cian's license, even when based upon numerous uncorroborated hear-
90. CAL. GOVT CODE ANN. § 11501 (West 1966). See note 41 supra.
91. See notes 59-60 supra and accompanying text.
92. CAL. Gov'T CODE ANN. § 11513(c) (West Supp. 1975) (emphasis added); see
Note, Hearsay Under The Administrative Procedure Act, 15 HASTINGS L. 369 (1964).
93. CAL. Gov'T CODE ANN. § 11513(c) (West. Supp. 1975).
94. Where Walker held that "hearsay evidence alone" was "insufficient," section
11513(c) likewise provides that such evidence is not "sufficient in itself to support a
finding . . . " Id.
95. Id. (emphasis added).
96. See 20 Cal. 2d at 879, 881-82, 129 P.2d at 350-51.
97. 102 Cal. App. 2d 926, 229 P.2d 27 (1951).
98. Id. at 932-33, 229 P.2d at 31.
99. Nardoni v. McConnell, 48 Cal. 2d 500, 504-05, 310 P.2d 644, 647 (1957)
(license-disciplinary proceeding wherein testimony of "numerous witnesses" used in
addition to hearsay evidence); Harris v. Alcoholic Beverage Control Appeals Bd., 212
Cal. App. 2d 106, 122-23, 28 Cal. Rptr. 74, 84 (1963) (direct evidence given by officers
used to supplement hearsay compilation); Dyer v. Watson, 121 Cal. App. 2d 84, 92, 262
P.2d 873, 877-78 (1953) (appellant's own testimony supplemented by hearsay statements
of third parties).
100. Simpson v. City of Santa Monica, 145 Cal. App. 2d 386, 388-89, 302 P.2d 455,
456 (1956) (revocation of permit to operate a massage parlor).
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say statements by several different persons, is insufficient to support
certain charges of "unprofessional conduct" in violation of a state stat-
ute.1' 1 This same standard of evaluation has also been invoked in em-
ployee dismissal cases. Findings of the State Personnel Board have
been held to be based upon insufficient evidence despite the fact that
the uncorroborated hearsay testimony was that of a state corrections
officer and was supported by the written report of another officer.
102
The specific procedures provided for in California Government
Code section 11513(c) have, for the most part, resulted in the general
application of the Walker holding to the administrative agencies af-
fected by Government Code section 11501. The Walker rule applies
with equal force to agencies not governed by section 11513(c) unless
otherwise specifically provided for by statute. 0 3 Consequently, where
there is no evidence sufficient to sustain a finding, the agency lacks
the requisite jurisdiction to thereafter proceed with the matter. 0 4
C. The Objection and Subpoena Issues
The Walker rule and Government Code section 11513(c) substan-
tially limit certain agencies in making a finding based on uncor-
roborated hearsay; nevertheless, only in the case of a judicial proceed-
ing will a ruling be upheld for a failure to object to incompetent hear-
say.'0 5 Section 11513(c), while it permits the admission of any "rele-
vant evidence," even "over objection," specifically limits the use of
101. Sunseri v. Board of Medical Examiners, 224 Cal. App. 2d 309, 316-18, 36 Cal.
Rptr. 553, 558 (1964).
102. Martin v. State Personnel Bd., 26 Cal. App. 3d 573, 577-79, 103 Cal. Rptr. 306,
308-10 (1972). A brief but interesting discussion of the "evidentiary logic" used in these
settings can be found in Steams v. Fair Employment Practice Comm'n, 6 Cal. 3d 205,
210 n.2, 490 P.2d 1155, 1158 n.2, 98 Cal. Rptr. 467, 470 n.2 (1971).
103. Compare CAL. WELF. & INSr'NS CODE ANN. § 10955 (West 1972), with CAL.
LABOR CODE ANN. § 5703 (West 1971). Regarding the applicability of the APA, see
WrnrN, supra note 21, at 33-34; Note, Hearsay Under the Administrative Procedure
Act, 15 HAsTINGS LJ. 369-70 n.6 (1964). For all agencies are governed by the APA.
See CAL. Gov'T CODE ANN. § 11501 (West Supp. 1975). The excluded agencies have
their own administrative procedures. See, e.g., CAL. Bus. & PROp. CODE ANN. § 6001
(West 1974); CAL. WELF. & I~s'r'Ns CODE ANN. § 10955 (West 1972); note 123 infra.
104. Swars v. Council of the City of Vallejo, 64 Cal. App. 2d 858, 864, 149 P.2d 397,
400 (1944), cited approvingly in La Prade v. Department of Water & Power, 27 Cal. 2d
847, 851, 162 P.2d 13, 16 (1945).
105. WrrmiN, supra note 21, at 32, 1207-10. In this respect Witkin notes:
In judicial proceedings the rule is well established that incompetent hearsay ad-
mitted without objection is sufficient to sustain a finding or judgment .... But
this is not true under the Administrative Procedure Act.
Id. at 32. Cf. Davis, An Approach to Problems of Evidence in the Administrative
Process, 55 HIAv. L. Rv. 364, 380-81, 390-93 (1942). But see note 110 infra.
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hearsay evidence to "supplementing or explaining other evidence."
Since the Code makes no allowance for hearsay objections to the ad-
mission of evidence, the general rule has developed in adminis-
trative law that the failure to object will not bar a reversal of an
-agency's decision based upon uncorroborated hearsay.100  "TMhis
limitation on the effect of hearsay evidence in proceedings to which
section 11513 is applicable . . . is [thus] not dependent upon whether
or not an objection is made to its admission."' 07  The holding in Mar-
tin v. State Personnel Board'08 (an employee dismissal case) has firmly
re-established the rule that "the limitation on hearsay as expressed in
. . . 11513(c) is not waived by a failure to object."' 0 9  The court ex-
plained:
If evidence (here, by statute) has insufficient probative value to sus-
tain the proposition for which it is offered, the want of objection adds
nothing to its worth and it will not support a finding." 0°
The same rule would most likely be applicable to non-APA cases af-
fected by the Walker rule since the court's holding apparently provided
for the admissibility of hearsay evidence even over objection."
106. While this body of the law was still in its early stages of development, Robert
Benjamin, in his report on administrative adjudication in New York, observed:
Since legally incompetent evidence is admissible in a quasi-judicial hearing, I can
see no logical basis for requiring an objection to its admission on technical grounds,
as a prerequisite to asserting the legal residuum rule ....
BENJA iN, supra note 81, at 188.
107. Swegle v. State Bd. of Equalization, 125 Cal. App. 2d 432, 439, 270 P.2d 518,
522 (1954) (Dooling, J., concurring).
108. 26 Cal. App. 3d 573, 103 Cal. Rptr. 306 (1972); see notes 159-61 infra and
accompanying text.
109. ADM MsrATrVE MANDAMUS, supra note 21, 29 (Supp. 1975).
110. Martin v. State Personnel Bd., 26 Cal. App. 3d 573, 583, 103 Cal. Rptr. 306, 312
(1972). Something of the same rationale of the Martin rule can be found in the dissent
of then Chief Justice Gibson, joined by Justice Traynor, in Allen v. Los Angeles County
Dist. Council of Carpenters, 51 Cal. 2d 805, 337 P.2d 457 (1959):
Moreover, all the evidence offered against plaintiff at the union hearing was hear-
say not falling within any applicable exception to the hearsay rule, and a person
cannot properly be expelled solely on the basis of such evidence. . . . This diffi-
culty is not obviated by the fact that plaintiff did not object when the evidence was
received. . . . [A] failure to object in an informal proceeding where technical
rules are inapplicable should not be given the same effect as where a court trial
is involved. Accordingly, plaintiff cannot be held to have waived his right to com-
plain that the expulsion was based entirely on hearsay evidence.
Id. at 818, 337 P.2d at 465 (Gibson, C.J., dissenting).
While the Martin court never referred to the majority rule established in Allen, the
cases are nevertheless readily distinguishable. Allen, unlike Martin, involved a discipli-
nary hearing which was not governed by section 11513(c) or by "the legal rules of
evidence but by the terms of its own constitution and by-laws." 51 Cal. 2d at 811, 337
P.2d at 460. Under the applicable laws in Allen, an objection was statutorily required in
order to attack a board's findings. Id. Suffice it to note that the traditional procedural
rules in union hearings differ from those under section 11513 (c) and the like.
111. Walker v. City of San Gabriel, 20 Cal. 2d 879, 881, 129 P.2d 349, 351 (1942).
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The objection issue raises still another and perhaps more fundamen-
tal question-a question necessarily germane to the application of the
Walker rule. What effect, if any, does the availability of the subpoena
power'12 in administrative proceedings have on the sufficiency of un-
corroborated hearsay to sustain a finding or judgment? Does the fail-
ure to subpoena the declarant of potential hearsay testimony amount
to a waiver of the right to later object to the sufficiency of the evi-
dence?
These questions were raised in the federal case of Richardson v.
Perales,"13 decided by the United States Supreme Court in 1971.
Perales involved a disability claimant who was denied insurance bene-
fits under the Social Security Act" 4 on the basis of adverse hearsay
medical reports."; Additionally, the claimant was statutorily entitled
to subpoena witnesses16--an opportunity to which no resort was ever
made.117 The Perales Court held that the uncorroborated hearsay was
sufficient as rebuttal evidence "when the claimant has not exercised
his right to subpoena the [hearsay declarant] and thereby provide
himself with the opportunity for cross-examination .... ,,18
This requirement in a Perales-like application context seems reason-
able in that the claimant is the moving party upon whom the burden of
proof rests." 9 This is not the case, however, where a recipient (the non-
moving party) is affected. The burden of proof is simply not on that
party. To require a party threatened with the deprivation of a funda-
mental vested right to subpoena the moving party's adverse wit-
nesses amounts to an unwarranted shifting of the respective burdens. 2 9
In effect, it compels the party adversely affected to assist the moving
party in divesting the former of otherwise protected entitlements. Ad-
ditionally, the Perales applicant-subpoena requirement, when invoked
See also id. at 882, 129 P.2d at 351 (Traynor, J., concurring). But see Allen v. Los
Angeles County Dist. Council of Carpenters, 51 Cal. 2d 805, 337 P.2d 457 (1959).
112. CAL. Gov'T CODE ANN. § 11190 (West 1966).
113. 402U.S. 389 (1971).
114. Id. at 390.
115. Id. at 396.
116. Id. at 397.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 402. But see note 48 supra. The significance of the passage cited for
purposes of the residuum rule in the federal courts is discussed in ADm, STRATiVE LAW
TEXT, supra note 1, at 281-82.
119. See notes 10 & 29 supra.
120. See notes 44-45 supra and accompanying text.
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in the deprivation context, raises due process issues with ramifications
extending beyond the judicially created Walker doctrine.' 2'
D. Worker's Compensation Proceedings
22
The applicable provisions of the California Worker's Compen-
sation Act provide that neither the appeals board nor a referee are
bound by the "common law or statutory rules of evidence and pro-
cedure."'12  Nevertheless, the burden of proof "rests upon the party
holding the affirmative of the issue.' 24 To that extent, Worker's Com-
121. For an additional discussion of the due process implications, see pt. V infra.
Even in the application context due process problems are likely to arise. Regarding the
subpoena issue discussed in Perales, it has been noted:
... Kelly was more significant in the analysis it applied, stating that "[t]he oppor-
tunity to be heard must be tailored to the capacities and circumstances of those who
are to be heard." It is in this respect that Perales is most inconsistent with Kelly,
for the Court relied upon the claimant's theoretical right to subpoena witnesses
without asking whether that right was effectively available to most claimants. In
fact, it may not be; most claimants are not represented by counsel and neither the
notice of hearing nor the booklet given ... informs them of the right.
The Supreme Court, 1970 Term, 85 Htv. L. REv. 326, 332-33 (1971) (footnotes
omitted). A further discussion of still other issues in the Perales case can also be found
at pt. V infra.
One final aspect of the Perales case merits comment. This factor concerns the
imposition of costly additional administrative burdens upon the agency as a result of
more rigid adjudicative procedures. See 402 U.S. at 406. This, stated Justice Blackmun,
"is an additional and pragmatic factor which, although not controlling, deserves men-
tion." Id. (emphasis added). What is controlling, as stated by the majority in Goldberg v.
Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970) (see note 205 infra), is that the recipient's interests in
survival outweigh the interests of "conserving fiscal and administrative resources." Id. at
265. Certainly, there is a peculiar irony in attacking the burdensome cost of requiring the
presence of all adverse hearsay declarants while at the same time acknowledging the
"right," 402 U.S. at 402 (later referred to as an "opportunity," id. at 404), of the party
adversely affected to subpoena those same declarants at the government's expense. On
the other hand, if there does exist a statutory or judicial entitlement to subpoena
witnesses, then the waiver "penalty" is non-applicable. Accordingly, conservation of
"fiscal and administrative resources" cannot be seriously jeopardized once such a right is
already granted. (The only way-the most likely way- an agency could save money ii
light of the right acknowledged in Perales is by employing inadequate notice proce-
dures.) The expense of exercising that right should not be the controlling factor-once
given, the right should be made secure.
122. See CAL. CoNsT. art. 20, § 21 (1975).
A practical, if somewhat dated, overview of this general area can be found in Bancroft,
Some Procedural Aspects of the California Workmen's Compensation Law, 40 CALIF.
L. REv. 378 (1952).
123. CAL. LABOR CODE ANN. §§ 5708-09 (West 1971). Government Code section
11513 is inapplicable to these proceedings since the Division of Industrial Accidents is
not one of the agencies enumerated under Government Code section 11501. Labor Code
sections 5700-10 set out the procedures to be followed in Worker's Compensation
hearings.
124. CAL. LABOR CODE ANN. § 5705 (West 1971). In these proceedings, absent the
"affirmative defenses" provided for in section 5705, the burden of proof is upon the
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pensation hearing procedures follow the general administrative law
practice. However, the Labor Code provides for two separate stan-
dards of admissibility. First, section 5708 provides that evidence
"which is best calculated to ascertain the substantial rights of the parties
and carry out justly the spirit and provisions" of the applicable laws
is admissible. 2 " Second, section 5703 specifically enunciates certain
kinds of hearsay which shall be admissible. 126 While this statutory pro-
claimant. See Lundberg v. Workmen's Compensation Appeals Bd., 69 Cal. 2d 436, 439,
445 P.2d 300, 301, 71 Cal. Rptr. 684, 685 (1968); Pacific Employers Ins. Co. v. Indus-
trial Accident Comm'n, 19 Cal. 2d 622, 628, 122 P.2d 570, 573 (1942); O'Hare v. In-
dustrial Accident Comm'n, 44 Cal. App. 2d 629, 633, 112 P.2d 915 (1941). Likewise,
once compensation has issued and the insurer thereafter seeks a reduction in grant allot-
ments, the burden is upon the party opting for a change in the status quo. See Contract-
ors Indem. Exch. v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 72 Cal. App. 350, 353, 237 P. 404,
405 (1925).
125. CAL. LABOR CODE ANN. § 5708 (West 1971). The code provides in relevant
parts:
All hearings. . . before the appeals board or a referee are governed by this divi-
sion and by the rules of practice and procedures adopted by the appeals board ...
mhey shall not be bound by the common law or statutory rules of evidence and
procedure, but may make inquiry in the manner, through oral testimony and
records, which is best calculated to ascertain the substantial rights of the parties
and carry out justly the spirit and provisions of the division ....
id. (emphasis added).
To the extent that section 5703 governs other classes of evidence within "this
division," it permits the automatic admission of certain kinds of evidence. On the other
hand section 5703 does not make all other kinds of evidence likewise admissible. In the
case of the latter, section 5708 affords the applicable standard. Of course, Labor Code
section 5709 provides in relevant part:
No order, decision, award, or rule shall be invalidated because of the admission into
the record. . . of any evidence not admissible under the common law or statutory
rules of evidence and procedure.
CAL. LABOR CODE ANN. § 5709 (West 1971). Section 5709 thus reiterates, but with
greater force, the "shall not be bound by the common law or statutory rules of evidence"
provision of section 5708. Since section 5708 places certain limitations, however mini-
mal, on the procedures to be adopted, section 5709 cannot be reasonably interpreted to
permit a carte blanche admission of all evidence. It is suggested that section 5709
accomplishes two ends. First, it assures that evidence admissible under section 5703 will
not later be invalidated. Second, section 5709 suggests that when hearsay evidence is
found admissible for the purposes of 5708, the fact that such evidence would otherwise
be inadmissible shall not compel the reviewing court to overturn the agency's ruling.
126. CAL. LABOR CODE ANN. § 5703 (West 1971) provides:
The appeals board may receive as evidence. . . the following matters, in addition
to sworn testimony presented in open hearing:
(a) Reports of attending or examining physicians.
(b) Reports of special investigators appointed by the appeals board or a referee
to investigate and report upon any scientific or medical question.
(c) Reports of employers, containing copies of time sheets, book accounts, re-
ports, and other records properly authenticated.
(d) Properly authenticated copies of hospital records of the case of the injured
employee.
(e) All publications of the Division of Industrial Accidents.
(f) All official publications of state and United States governments.
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vision is somewhat tailored to meet the needs of the class of litigants
affected, the logic behind the Code relies upon broader rules of evi-
dentiary procedure. The class of evidence designated as admis-
sible suggests that certain kinds of hearsay evidence are more inher-
ently reliable than others, that particular kinds of evidence can be
"intrinsically trustworthy,"' 27 and that, given the nature of the hearsay
offered, it may be of the kind "likely to be reliable.' 2  (This is true
despite the fact that some of the statutory provisions do not fall within
the traditional hearsay exceptions.) Section 5703 thus intimates the
sufficiency of the particular kinds of hearsay deemed admissible. As
to those kinds of hearsay evidence specifically enunciated, the Code
provides for the "use" of such evidence "as proof of any fact in dis-
pute.,, 29
The admissibility of evidence thus depends upon the kind of evi-
dence presented. If the hearsay is of that kind specifically enunciated
in one of the provisions of Labor Code section 5703, then it is auto-
matically admissible. All remaining hearsay evidence is evaluated un-
der the standard provided for in Labor Code section 5708 and is thus
not automatically admissible.'8 0 While section 5703 guarantees the
admissibility of certain kinds of hearsay evidence, section 5708 requires
an administrative evaluation of the evidence. Hearsay evidence stand-
ing alone which is not admissible under either section 5703 or section
5708 prevents the offering party from meeting the requisite burden of
proof. Since the standard of admissibility under section 5708 is a low
one, the better portion of all hearsay will be admissible in these pro-
ceedings. The admissibility of such evidence, though, will not always
ensure its sufficiency.
Under Labor Code section 5703, certain kinds of hearsay evidence
may be "use[d] as proof of any fact in dispute." The Code is silent
as to whether or not uncorroborated hearsay, even if it is of the class
of admissible evidence, is sufficient to support a finding. To the extent
(g) Excerpts from expert testimony received by the appeals board upon similar
issues of scientific fact in other cases and the prior decisions of the appeals board
upon such issues.
A general discussion of the admissibility of evidence in these hearings can be found in
Cooper, The Admissibility of Hearsay Before Workmen's Compensation Commissions,
31 DicrA 423 (1954).
127. See McCormick, supra note 21, at 844-45.
128. See Gellhorn, Rules of Evidence and Official Notice in Formal Administrative
Hearings, 1971 DuKE L.J. 1, 19.
129. CAL. LABOR CODE ANN. § 5703 (West 1971).
130. See Pacific Employees Ins. Co. v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 47 Cal. App. 2d
494, 499, 118 P.2d 334, 338 (1941).
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that section 5703 provides for the admission of only those kinds of
hearsay which are "intrinsically trustworthy" and therefore "likely to
be reliable," 131 "use" will be tantamount to "sufficiency." However,
while section 5703 goes just about that far, its words demonstrate a
cautious retreat from an absolute position.'3 2 The problem is that
while the general class of hearsay evidence deemed admissible under
the Code will more often than not be reliable, it does not necessarily
follow that it will be so in all cases. The Code seems to take this into
account by providing only for the "use" of such evidence. In those few
instances where section 5703 hearsay, though admissible, seems unre-
liable, other provisions written into the Labor Code come into play.
33
The standard for evaluating the overall sufficiency of hearsay evi-
dence (including section 5703 hearsay) is quite flexible. Section 5708
requires that the evidence be such that it is "calculated to ascertain the
substantial rights of the parties." Additionally, this section requires the
referee to "carry out justly the spirit and provisions' '1 34 of the appli-
cable laws. This standard, if it is a standard at all, in effect defers the
sufficiency of the hearsay determination to the discretion of the ad-
ministrative agency, subject only to final judicial review. Accordingly,
early decisional law in this area carved out a rule that certain kinds
of uncorroborated hearsay were insufficient to sustain an award . 35
Relying on the "legal residuum" rule 36 in order to interpret the provi-
sions of section 5708, the court in Pacific Employers Insurance Co. v.
Industrial Accident Commission 37 held that "[a] material finding
131. See notes 127-28 supra and accompanying text.
132. Note that Labor Code section 5709's prohibition against invalidating certain
agency rulings likewise limits itself to the "use" designation. That a decision may not be
invalidated because the agency permitted the "use" of hearsay evidence is not the
equivalent of saying that such a decision cannot be overturned because the referee relied
entirely on uncorroborated hearsay.
133. See CAL. LABOR CODE ANN. §§ 5704 & 5708 (West 1971).
134. Id. § 5708.
135. Connolly v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 173 Cal. 405, 408, 160 P. 239, 240
(1916) (hearsay testimony of deceased's spouse that he had the status of an employee
for the purposes of "Workmen's" Compensation); Englebretson v. Industrial Accident
Comm'n, 170 Cal. 793, 798-99, 151 P. 421, 422-23 (1915) (hearsay testimony of
decedent and physician who examined him held insufficient to sustain an award); see
Continental Casualty Co. v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 195 Cal. 533, 541, 234 P. 317,
320 (1925) (although not expressly sustaining the sufficiency of the hearsay evidence,
the court upheld the referee's decision due to the petitioner's failure to object to the
evidence).
136. Carroll v. Knickerbocker Ice Co., 113 N.E. 507, 509 (N.Y. 1916). It is
noteworthy that the "legal residuum" rule won notoriety in a Worker's Compensation
case.
137. 47 Cal. App. 2d 494, 118 P.2d 334 (1941) (hearsay testimony of applicant that
medical condition was caused by a work related injury).
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based entirely upon hearsay testimony of an incompetent witness is in-
sufficient. It has no probative force and is not calculated to ascertain
the substantial rights of the parties."' 3 8  The fact that the witness
lacked the requisite expertise to testify to the matters asserted,8 9 per-
mitted the Pacific Employers court to rule as it did; the hearsay mat-
ter seemed secondary. Nevertheless, the court did not drop the hear-
say issue until it had offered a few guidelines of its own. It pointed
out that the hearsay evidence must be of a "substantial character from
which the commission may deduce a reasonable inference. Other
courts have held that the uncorroborated hearsay evidence must be
such that it is "not manifestly absurd and inherently improbable."'
14
Where the uncorroborated hearsay evidence meets the aforesaid
threshold of trustworthiness, it may be sufficient evidence upon which
to base an award.142  Accordingly, the California Supreme Court
in Sada v. Industrial Accident Commission 43 had earlier ruled that
mere hearsay "may be sufficient" to the extent that it carries "con-
vincing force.' 44  What the Sada rule implied (and what the other
cases demonstrated) is that the reviewing court will quite often require
a stricter standard of evaluation where only uncorroborated hearsay is
offered;' 4 - however, it will not go so far as to require that there always
exist a legal residuum of evidence. 40 Although the various require-
ments certainly appear to be "catch all" phrases, nevertheless, their ap-
plication can serve to limit the worth placed upon mere hearsay evi-
dence to not only a legal preference for certain kinds of hearsay over
others, but also a judicial tendency to look to the loss suffered on the
138. Id. at 499, 118 P.2d at 338; see City & County of San Francisco v. Industrial
Accident Comm'n, 117 Cal. App. 2d 455, 459, 256 P.2d 81, 83 (1953) (non-expert
hearsay testimony); 2 B. WrIXIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW 1082-83 (8th ed.
1973).
139. 47 Cal. App. 2d at 499, 118 P.2d at 338.
140. Id. at 500, 118 P.2d at 338.
141. Hendricks v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 25 Cal. App. 2d 534, 537, 78 P.2d
189, 190 (1938) (secondhand hearsay which conflicted with prior statements of the
witness).
142. See Sada v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 11 Cal. 2d 263, 78 P.2d 1127 (1938).
143. 11 Cal. 2d 263, 78 P.2d 1127 (1938).
144. Id. at 268, 78 P.2d at 1129.
145. The Sada case, while it did not find the uncorroborated hearsay evidence (third
party testimony that the "decedent was injured in the course of his employment by
petitioners") insufficient to sustain the agency's finding, did, nevertheless, remand the
case for "further proceedings before the commission." Id. at 269, 78 P.2d at 1129-30.
146. London Guar. & Accident Co. v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 203 Cal. 12, 14-
15, 263 P. 196, 197 (1927). Cf. Pacific Employees Ins. Co. v. Industrial Accident
Comm'n, 47 Cal. App. 2d 494, 499, 118 P.2d 334, 338 (1941).
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basis of the evidence offered. Perhaps that is all that can be said for
the present state of law; the "convincing force" test to the extent that
it is the standard of evaluation, 14 7 can mean no more than what has
here been suggested.
E. The Right to Cross-Examine Adverse Witnesses
Despite the lack of any practical limitations on the sufficiency of
mere hearsay evidence, other factors come into play which involve
additional or alternative considerations. Thus Professor Cooper notes:
The general theory is clear-the agency is not to be permitted to base
its ruling on evidence which is devoid of evidential value, and the re-
spondent must be given a fair opportunity to demonstrate the unrelia-
bility of the proffered proof. 48
This demonstration is quite often best facilitated by oral cross-exami-
nation. In this respect, Mr. Witkin, noted commentator on California
law, has correctly observed that Labor Code sections 5703 and 5704
require "an opportunity to cross examine the author of a report, if he
is available."' 49  Thus in the oft quoted case of Massachusetts Bond-
ing Insurance Co. v. Industrial Accident Commission,'5" the court
declared: "The deprival of due process lies not in the concealment of
the evidence but in the lack of opportunity for cross-examination and
rebuttal which results from the concealment."'"' The magnitude of
this rule suggests that where cross-examination of an adverse witness
is requested, any subsequent denial of that opportunity could amount
to a deprivation of due process and therefore may constitute reversible
error. 5 2  Subsequent case law has upheld the Massachusetts Bonding
147. The court in McAllister v. Workmen's Comp. Appeals Bd., 69 Cal. 2d 408, 455
P.2d 313, 71 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1968), held that "the applicant need only establish the
reasonable probability of industrial causation." 69 Cal. 2d at 413, 455 P.2d at 315, 71
Cal. Rptr. at 699 (emphasis added). This language would seem to lower the requisite
standard of evaluation enunciated in Sada at least in application cases.
148. 1 COOPER, supra note 10, at 372. See generally id. at 371-79.
149. WnXmN, supra note 21, at 34-35. For the text of Labor Code 5703, see note 133
supra. Labor Code section 5704 provides:
Transcripts of all testimony taken without notice and copies of all reports and
other matters added to the record, otherwise than during the course of an open hear-
ing, shall be served upon the parties to the proceeding, and an opportunity shall
be given to produce evidence in explanation or rebuttal thereof before decision is
rendered.
CAL. LABOR CODE ANN. § 5704 (West 1971).
150. 74 Cal. App. 2d 911, 170 P.2d 36 (1946).
151. Id. at 916, 170 P.2d at 39. The court went on to add: "There is no magic in the
mere disclosure of the evidence where the adverse party is denied all right to test or
countervail it." Id.; see note 215 infra.
152. The scope of the rule likewise makes it applicable to section 5708.
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rule. 5 3  The requirement that the party adversely affected have an
opportunity to cross-examine the declarant of the hearsay is precisely
what prompted the court in Walker to rule that the board's decision
amounted to an abuse of discretion.'54 While "the general tendency
in state court decisions is to insist that the right of cross-examination
be afforded whenever there is substantial reason to believe that denial
thereof might impede the discovery of truth,"'' 5 sections 5703 and
5704 seem to fashion a broader rule to the extent that only the avail-
ability of the declarant is determinative of whether or not the right shall
issue.
The Gordian knot in this area of a right to cross-examine is the doc-
trine of waiver. Early case law had held that unobjected-to hearsay
evidence was sufficient to sustain a finding.15 0 That same era of the
law, however, fashioned the rule that in order for there to be a waiver
of a right, there must be knowledge of the existence of the right com-
bined with the requisite intent to forfeit it.157  Where doubt exists the
rule operates "against a waiver."' 58 Thus there must exist a "clear
showing of an intent to relinquish such right,"' 59 and a waiver will not
be presumed absent a showing of prejudice.60 The above maxims ap-
ply only where there is an entitlement to object. Such an entitlement
cannot be said to exist where a statute like section 5703 makes certain
kinds of hearsay automatically admissible. (Objections are not made
153. Other cases have followed the Massachusetts Bonding rule. E.g., Hegglin v.
Workmen's Compensation Appeals Bd., 4 Cal. 3d 162, 175, 480 P.2d 967, 975, 93 Cal.
Rptr. 15, 23 (1971); Caesar's Restaurant v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 175 Cal. App,
2d 850, 854-55, 1 Cal. Rptr. 97, 100-01 (1959); Columbia-Geneva Steel Division, United
States Steel Co. v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 115 Cal. App. 2d 862, 865, 253 P.2d 45,
47 (1953).
154. Walker v. City of San Gabriel, 20 Cal. 2d 879, 881-82, 129 P.2d 349, 351
(1942).
155. 1 COOPER, supra note 10, at 374; see BENJAMIN, supra note 81, at 196.
156. Continental Cas. Co. v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 195 Cal. 533, 541-42, 234
P. 317, 320 (1925).
157. Craig v. White, 187 Cal. 489, 498-99, 202 P. 648, 652 (1921).
158. Robertson v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 146 Cal. App. 2d 627, 629, 304 P.2d
202, 203 (1956); Grenenger v. Fisher, 81 Cal. App. 2d 549, 554, 184 P.2d 694, 697
(1947).
159. Caesar's Restaurant v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 175 Cal. App. 2d 850, 856, 1
Cal. Rptr. 97, 101 (1959), quoting Greninger v. Fisher, 81 Cal. App. 2d 549, 554, 184
P.2d 694, 697 (1947).
Many persons appear before administrative agencies without the benefit of counsel.
This raises the question whether there has been a knowing and intelligent waiver.
160. Caesar's Restaurant v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 175 Cal. App. 2d 850, 856, 1
Cal. Rptr. 97, 101 (1959), quoting Craig v. White, 187 Cal. 489, 98, 202 P. 648, 652
(1921); see notes 108-11 supra and accompanying text.
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to that which is deemed permissible.) This is the same non-waiver
principle that was considered earlier in the APA context. 161
IV. Tim "LEGAL RESIDUUM" RULE: A FEW HARSH WORDS
The preceding discussion has for the most part hinged upon what
has traditionally been referred to as the "legal residuum" rule. Its
origin in administrative law traces back more than a half century.
162
The nature of the rule as well as its tenured status in the law has made
it a prime target for sharp criticism. 163 A full discussion of this pre-
script and its development in the body of administrative law would
more than exhaust the limited scope of this Comment. Accordingly,
this examination will confine itself to only a general statement of
the rule-taking due account of what has already been presented-
161. See notes 104-11 supra and accompanying text.
162. See note 81 supra.
163. The rule has been discussed or criticized in the following: BENJAMIN, supra note
81, at 181-94; COOPER, supra note 10, at 389-93, 406-11; ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TEXr,
supra note 1, at 277-85; ADMINISTRATIVE LAw TREATISE, supra note 21, at 291-323; id.
at 487-95, 499-505 (Supp. 1970); K. DAVIs, HANDBOOK ON ADMINIrATrVE LAW 458-66
(1951); K. DAviS, ADMmISTRATIVE LAW: CASES-TEXT-PROBLEMS 390-401 (1973);
M. FORKOSCH, A TREATISE ON ADmuSTRATIVE LAW 431-33 (1956); E. GELLHORN,
ADmINSTRATIVE LAW AND PROCESS IN A NUTsHELL 190-92 (1972); W. GELLHORN,
FEDERAL ADmimNs TrvE PROCEEDINGS 100-15 (1941); W. GELLoRN & C. BYSE,
ADMINSTRATIVE LAW: CASES AND CoMmENTs 923-34 (4th ed. 1960); L. JAFFE & N.
NATHANSON, ADmINISTRAT LAw: CASES AND MATERIALS 424-34 (3d ed. 1968);
McCoRMIcK, supra note 21, at 847-48; B. ScHwARTz, AN INTRODUCTION TO AmERICAN
ADmINISTRATIVE LAW 136-37 (2d ed. 1962); H. STEPHENS, ADmINISTRATiVE TRIBUNALS
AND THE RULES OF EVIDENCE 59-67 (1933); 1 WIGMORE, supra note 54, at 39-42, 79-92;
id. at 17-35 (1975 Supp.); Davis, An Approach to Problems of Evidence in the
Administrative Process, 55 H.-Iv. L. REV. 364, 374-76, 390-93 (1942); Davis, An
Approach to Rules of Evidence for Nonjury Cases, 50 A.B.AJ. 723, 725 (1964); Davis,
Evidence Reform: The Administrative Process Leads the Way, 34 MINN. L. REV. 581,
592-600 (1950); Davis, Hearsay in Administrative Hearings, 32 GEo. WASH. L. REv.
689, 695-700 (1964); Davis, The Residuum Rule in Administrative Law, 28 ROCKY MT.
L. Rnv. 1 (1955) [hereinafter cited as Residuum Rule]; Davis, Evidence, 30 N.Y.U.L.
REV. 1309, 1330-36, 1339-41 (1955); Gellhorn, Rules of Evidence and Official Notice in
Formal Administrative Hearings, 1971 DuTE L.J 1, 22-26; Lewis, Administrative Law, 8
RUTGERs L. REv. 45, 59-62 (1953); Merrill, Rules of Evidence in Administrative
Proceedings, 14 OKLA. B.AJ. 1934, 1940 (1943); Schwartz, A Decade of Administrative
Law: 1942-1951, 51 MICH. L. REV. 775, 815-18 (1953); Vanderbilt, The Technique of
Proof Before Administrative Bodies, 24 IowA L. REv. 465 (1939); Weinstein, Probative
Force of Hearsay, 46 IowA L. REV. 331, 346-50 (1961); Wigmore, Administrative
Boards and Commissions: Are the Jury-Trial Rules of Evidence in Force for Their
Inquiries?, 17 ILL. L. REV. 263, 278-79 (1922); Note, The Weight to be Given Hearsay
Evidence By Administrative Agencies: The "Legal Residuum" Rule, 26 BROOKLYN L.
REv. 265 (1960); Note, The Residuum Rule and Appellate Fact Review: Marriage of
Necessity, 13 RUTGERS L. REv. 254 (1958).
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along with a presentation of some of the more renown and insightful
criticisms of the rule.
In 1914 a peculiar death occurred which provided the catalyst for
a then even more peculiar rule in the history of administrative law.
The incident involved an accident in which a "300 pound cake of ice"
was said to have accidentally fallen on the deceased.'0 4 The story of
this alleged work-related accident was told by the deceased to his wife,
along with several other persons, prior to his death.16 These hearsay
statements were found by the administrative commission to be suffi-
cient to support a "Workmen's" Compensation award, despite eye-wit-
ness testimony to the contrary. When the case of Carroll v. Knicker-
bocker Ice Co."6' came before the New York Court of Appeals, the
court split with four justices constituting the majority,10 7 one justice
concurring in the result, 08 and the remaining two justices dissenting.'
Given this setting, Justice Cuddeback writing for the majority, although
acknowledging the commission's discretionary powers and indepen-
dence from the technical rules of evidence, nevertheless issued the fol-
lowing prophetic words which came to be the legal "open sesame".
"[-]n the end there must be a residuum of legal evidence to support
the claim before an award can be made.' 70  In short, the majority did
not believe that the hearsay evidence in that case-hearsay otherwise
inadmissible over objection in a civil court-was sufficiently probative
to support a finding.' 71 That is, there existed no residue of legal evi-
164. Carroll v. Knickerbocker Ice Co., 113 N.E. 507, 508 (N.Y. 1916).
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. Justice Cuddeback wrote the majority opinion in which Justices Collin, Hiscock
and Hogan joined.
168. Chief Justice Bartlett wrote a separate concurring opinion.
169. Justices Seabury and Pound provided the dissenting opinions, each of whom
concurred in the opinion of the other.
170. 113 N.E. at 509. The court in establishing this rule cited with approval the
Appellate Division dissenting opinion of Justice Woodward:
There must be in the record some evidence of a sound, competent, and recognizedly
probative character to sustain the findings and award made, else the findings and
award must in fairness be set aside by (the) court.
Id., quoting 155 N.Y.S. 1, 8 (Sup. Ct. 1915) (Woodward, J., dissenting).
"Legal evidence" includes hearsay admissible over objection in a civil action.
171. A careful reading of Carroll reveals that perhaps the court did not establish as
broad a rule as that which it has come to be credited. Consider the following
statements:
The only substantial evidence before the workmen's compensation commission
was to the effect that no cake of ice slipped and struck the decedent, and there were
no bruises or marks upon his body which indicated that he had been so injured.
The findings to the contrary rest solely on the decedent's statement made at a time
when he was confessedly in a highly nervous state, which ended in his death from
delirium tremens. Such hearsay testimony is no evidence.
[Vol. 8
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dence upon which to sustain a ruling. The rule operates so as to re-
quire "a reviewing court to set aside an administrative finding unless
the finding is supported by evidence which would be admissible in a
jury trial."'172
The Walker rule that "hearsay evidence alone is insufficient to sup-
port [a decision]"'173 and the California statutory mandate that such
evidence "shall not be sufficient in itself to support a finding unless
. .. admissible over objection' 1 74 appear to be but a restatement of
the Carroll requirement that there must exist at a bare minimum a
"residuum of legal evidence."' 75  Despite any differences 76 that these
Id. at 509 (emphasis added). Whether or not the term "[sluch" refers to the particular
hearsay in the case or hearsay generally is perhaps somewhat ambiguous within the
context of the passage quoted. However, this ambiguity can be resolved by an examina-
tion of the preceding language which framed the issue: "The question is presented
whether this hearsay testimony is sufficient under the circumstances of the case to sus-
tain the finding of the commission." Id. at 508 (emphasis added). The court's language
might then be interpreted to indicate a concern with the particular kind of hearsay under
review, rather than as a blanket rule regarding the sufficiency of all hearsay. Does a
more conservative-a more accurate-reading of -the Carroll rule in its own particular
setting imply a more middle of the road approach and/or a prelude of things to come?
See text accompanying notes 95 & 96 supra and 216, 217, 235 & 257 infra.
Chief Justice Bartlett's concurring opinion starts off from a somewhat different
perspective. Rather than focusing on the credibility of the hearsay evidence in itself, the
Chief Justice concurred in the result on the basis of the substantial amount of direct
evidence which contradicted the former. Id. at 509. Thereafter he adds: "This view
accords with the liberal spirit of the enactment without giving to hearsay evidence a
sanction which I cannot believe the legislature intended to give it." Id. (emphasis added).
Note the general nature of the Chief Justice's interpretation of the majority rule. No
qualifiers (i.e., "this hearsay testimony") are found in his statement of the rule. The rule
as suggested in the concurring opinion is broader in scope than what the holding states or
even implies. Perhaps several generations of law as well as a multitude of commentaries
are based not on the limited scope of the Carroll holding, but rather, on the statements
in the concurring opinion, and maybe the dissents as well. See id. at 509, 511 (Seabury,
J. & Pound, J., dissenting).
172. ADMINmATvE LAw TExT, supra note 1, at 277.
173. Walker v. City of San Gabriel, 20 Cal. 2d 879, 881, 129 P.2d 349, 351 (1942).
174. CAL. Gov'T CODE ANN. § 11513(c) (West Supp. 1975).
175. Carroll v. Knickerbocker Ice Co., 113 N.E. 507, 509 (N.Y. 1916).
176. The differences between the Walker facts and those in Carroll are noteworthy.
First, Walker was a termination case, while Carroll involved an application. As discussed
in notes 10, 26, 29 & 31 supra and accompanying text, this difference affects the burden
of proof issue as well as the subpoena requirement (see notes 111-21 supra and accompa-
nying text). Second, Carroll was a "Workmen's" Compensation case, while Walker in-
volved a license revocation matter. The history and rules of the former have tradition-
ally differed from those of the latter. Third, the Walker court established a gen-
eral rule as to the probative value of uncorroborated hearsay, while Carroll can be
interpreted to be more limited in its scope. See note 171 supra. Fourth, Walker
emphasized the mere "recital" character of the hearsay evidence upon which a license
revocation was ordered. See notes 77-78 supra and accompanying text. The recital issue
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three rules may have in principle or application, this Comment will ad-
dress itself to the traditional criticisms of the general rule.17 Since
is technically separate from the legal residuum requirement in that the former is
concerned with the existence of proof to support an allegation, whereas the latter
pertains to the evaluation of evidence already presented. (In Walker there was only a
hearsay statement of the violations charged.) Fifth, the caliber of evidence in Walker
(letter regarding alleged violations signed by the chief of police) seems to be more
trustworthy than the hearsay statements in Carroll which were rebutted by strong direct
evidence. It is unlikely from the recital of the facts in Walker that the petitioner's
counsel in fact ever attempted to subpoena the hearsay declarants; he merely "replied
that until such persons. . . were produced. . . there was. . . nothing for the petitioner
to refute." 20 Cal. 2d at 880, 129 P.2d at 350. Should the results have been any
different if Walker's counsel had not so "replied"? After all, with or without such a
"reply" or even a "request," the "opportunity to cross-examine" the declarant is necessar-
ily "denied" whenever hearsay evidence is relied upon. Finally, how does the "availabili-
ty" of the declarant fit into these considerations? Since the right to cross-examine is
always absent here, should the evaluation of the hearsay evidence depend upon the
availability of the declarant? For example, if a social worker's report constitutes the sole
basis for termination of a welfare recipient's aid, should the social worker always be
present to be cross-examined under threat to the agency that failure to do so will result
in a decision in favor of the recipient? What if such declarants were more often than not
"readily available"? To the extent that hearsay evidence standing alone can sustain a
finding, the major concern must always be with the kind of evidence relied upon. Can
reasonable minds believe that the "peculiar" hearsay (self-serving in nature) in Carroll
was more reliable than the evidence relied upon in Walker? Consider Professor Davis'
brief comment on Walker-one of the few statements by Davis about the case-in The
Residuum Rule, supra note 163, at 26 n.117 (1955). The differences between the two
cases might 'well determine the respective scope of each rule as well as its proper appli-
cation.
177. The majority of discussions of the "legal residuum rule" tend to ignore any
consideration of either the nature of the hearsay in question or its relationship, if any, to
other nonhearsay evidence. A much needed presentation of just such consideration was
sketched in Note, The Residuum Rule and Appellate Fact Review: Marriage of
Necessity, 13 RUTGERS L. REV. 254, 255-56 (1958). That note emphasized the factors to
be considered in determining the probative value of particular classes of evidence. One of
the factors for consideration relates to the purpose for which the evidence is offered, that
is, "whether it is offered in support of the prima facie case or in support of the ultimate
determination." Id. at 255. Another factor concerns the reliance of hearsay evidence
upon nonhearsay evidence and whether the former standing alone is sufficiently proba-
tive "to prove a given fact or proposition." Id. Based on these two considerations, the
Note proceeds to offer four variations of the "legal residuum rule":
1. The restrictive residuum rule. Under this rule, incompetent evidence may not
be considered for the purpose of establishing the prima facie case or for the purpose
of supporting the ultimate determination. Agency action must rest solely on legally
competent evidence.
2. The pure residuum rule. Although this rule precludes the use of incompetent
evidence to establish the prima facie case, if it is considered relevant and reliable,
it may be used as a factor, in combination with competent evidence, to support the
ultimate determination, either directly or as a basis for inference drawing.
3. The liberal residuum rule. Here, if relevant and reliable, incompetent evi-
dence, when combined with competent evidence, may be used both to establish the
prima facie case and to support the ultimate determination.
4. The reliability rule. This rule allows the use of incompetent evidence, if rele-
vant and reliable, both as the sole basis for establishing the prima facie case and
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the maxim of the "legal residuum" requirement, as it has come to be
understood,1' 8 is an integral part of the California policy,' 9 the follow-
ing statements will, at the very least, afford a critical evaluation of the
general concept upon which all of the related rules rely.
The first criticism of the legal residuum rule in administrative pro-
ceedings was stated in Justice Pound's dissent in Carroll:
I think this case should not be disposed of by deciding that all evidence
held to be objectionable as hearsay in the courts of this state is without
probative force. Our law of evidence is largely a product of the jury
system. The purpose of its exclusionary rules is to keep from the jury,
not only all that is irrelevant, but also much that, although relevant, is
remote, or collateral, or nonprobative, and, therefore, tends to mislead
or confuse.180
Justice Pound looked to the particular proceeding and found it differ-
ent in nature from judicial proceedings, since the applicable law of the
latter was grounded in large part on the presence of a jury. Adminis-
trative proceedings, on the other hand, are conducted without the aid
of a jury and since the ruling agency has greater expertise in deciding
the factual matters it is called upon to hear, Justice Pound concluded
that a more relaxed standard should be permitted.' 8 '
as the sole basis, either directly or inferentially, for reaching the ultimate conclu-
sion.
Id. at 255-56 (footnotes omitted). Note, here the term "competency" refers to suffi-
ciency rather than to admissibility. See text accompanying note 102 supra.
The mandate of the first rule-that only "legally competent" evidence may be
considered-pertains to the sufficiency of certain kinds of evidence. The reasonable
application of this rule-the Carroll rule-would suggest that a finding could be based
on admissible hearsay evidence falling within a given hearsay exception. (However, it is
not altogether clear that the rule would so operate.) The second rule makes certain
evidentiary concessions for the use of relevant hearsay evidence when it is supported by
competent evidence which tends toward the "ultimate determination" of the case. In this
instance, hearsay evidence could come to the rescue of competent evidence after a prima
facie case had been established. The third rule is more general in that it requires only a
showing of relevancy to sustain a finding provided that the hearsay is combined with
competent evidence. Finally, the fourth rule disregards the need of any competent
evidence and instead focuses on the relevancy and reliability of the hearsay offered. Here
the yardstick for evaluation of hearsay evidence will be the extent to which the evidence
is the kind upon which "responsible persons are accustomed to rely in serious affairs."
178. See note 171 supra and accompanying text.
179. This policy does not include those agencies affected by Labor Code section 5703
or other applicable statutory law.
180. Carroll v. Knickerbocker Ice Co., 113 N.E. 507, 511 (N.Y. 1916) (emphasis
added); see note 171 supra.
181. The ascertainment of truth rather than the integrity of the rules being the
foremost consideration, we find that when the jury is absent the rules are less
strictly enforced; it being assumed that the court will not be easily confused or mis-
led by that which is irrelevant and inconclusive.
113 N.E. at 511.
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The late Professor John Wigmore expressed two major criticisms of
the rule. First, since the rule "still virtually requires the tribunal to
test its proceedings by the jury-trial rules," the very function of ad-
ministrative law is hampered by procedures not compatible with the
body of the work undertaken."8 2 Second, he argued that there is a
certain fallacy in the logic of the rule since it automatically equates
"legal evidence" with the "truth of the finding," while ignoring the pos-
sibility that "illegal" evidence may be equally probative and perhaps
closer to the truth.'-"
[T]he rule for a "residuum of legal evidence" rests on the assumption
that the "legal" evidence is always credible and sufficient, while the
"illegal" evidence is never credible nor sufficient. 184
After all, Wigmore maintained, "jury-trial rules merely determine what
evidence may be considered; they tell us nothing as to the mental proc-
ess of weighing it."' '85
In a well known 1942 report on administrative adjudication pre-
sented to the governor of New York, Robert Benjamin, like Wigmore
before him, raised the issue of the specific nexus between the evidence
relied upon and the decision rendered. 180  In addition, Benjamin con-
182. 1 WIGMORE, supra note 54, at 40-41. Thus Wigmore observes:
The very instant that the old rules of evidence are invoked, the informal character
of the hearing disappears, and the rigid, formal rules of procedure and all the tech-
nicalities incident to the practice of the law will grow up around the commission,
hampering and delaying it, working inconvenience and hardship upon the claimants,
and defeating the intent of the law.
Id., citing Carroll v. Knickerbocker Ice Co., 155 N.Y.S. 1, 3 (App. Div. 1915) (unoffi-
cial report incorrectly cited in Wigmore).
183. 1 WIGMORE, supra note 54, at 41.
184. Id. at 41-42. Additionally, he notes: "Both may be true; both may be false; it
depends in each case. But it does not depend on the one being 'legal' and the other being
'illegal', tested by the jury-trial rules of Evidence." Id. at 41.
185. Id. at 42. Wigmore's criticism is that the rule operates to deny the worth of
any and all illegal evidence no matter how credible it may prove to be. It simply fails
to recognize that illegal evidence can be a means to discover the truth of a given matter.
As Robert Benjamin noted:
In discussing the doctrine that the exclusionary rules of evidence are not legally
binding in quasi-judicial hearings, I have emphasized one of the reasons supporting
that doctrine-that utilization by an administrative tribunal of legally incompetent
evidence will often assist the tribunal to reach a correct result.
BENJAMn, supra note 81, at 184.
186. [The rule] ignores the circumstance that the residuum of legal evidence which
is required to support a finding may in fact have played little or no part in the
actual decision under review,-that decision may in fact have been based largely or
wholly on other logically probative but technically incompetent evidence. To make
the validity of the decision depend on the existence or non-existence of some bit
of competent evidence is to attribute to mere legal competency more weight, as an




tended that there were also other practical difficulties which hinder the
smooth working order of the rule. For example, where the "hearing
officer is not an expert in the rules of evidence, or where the parties
are not represented by counsel," determinations as to the legal suffi-
ciency of the evidence offered will be difficult if not impossible to
make. 1 7  In addition, the absence of the "objection" requirement
88
results in a more difficult determination of legal competency due to
the absence of any evidentiary challenges made at the time when the
evidence was initially introduced. 8 9
Much of this same thought has been expressed by Professor Kenneth
Culp Davis.' 90 In a relentless attack on the rule, an attack which has
lasted for at least a quarter of a century, Professor Davis rightfully
merits credit as the most outspoken and authoritative critic of the rule.
In a 1955 law review article, Professor Davis enunciated four reasons
for the rejection of the legal residuum rule:
1. Incompetent evidence admitted without objection may be given "its
natural probative effect" ....
2. The. . .rule is. . .inconsistent with the principle that expert opin-
ion ds admissible even when it is based upon inadmissible hearsay ...
3. [T]he strongest argument against the residuum rule is the lack of
correlation between reliability of evidence and the exclusionary rules of
evidence ....
4. Reliability of evidence must be judged in particular circumstances,
not in the abstract.' 9 '
The first criticism relies on the argument that the residuum rule is
illogical because it makes the "palpably false assumption that evidence
which would be excluded in a jury case is without probative effect.' 92
This criticism is similar to Wigmore's contention that the rule treats "il-
legal evidence" as if it were "never credible nor sufficient.'1 93  Davis'
second criticism demonstrates the illogical consequences which can
arise from a carte blanche application of the rule. This is borne out
187. Id. at 191.
188. See notes 105-11 supra and accompanying text.
189. Id.
190. The history of the Davis theory traces back over twenty years. See K. DAVIs,
ADMiNiSTRATIVE LAW 458-66 (1951); Residuum Rule, supra note 163; 2 ADvmiNmsTRATrv
LAW TItSE, supra note 21, at 291-303; ADMINISTRATIvE LAW TErr, supra note 1, at
277-81; K. DAvis, ADMINSTRATnVE LAW: CASES-TEXT-PROBLEMS 390-401 (1973).
191. Residuum Rule, supra note 163, at 2-5. No significant difference is to be found
between the 1955 statement of the criticisms and those criticisms enunciated in later
works. See note 190 supra.
192. Residuum Rule, supra note 163, at 3.
193. 1 WiGMORE, supra note 54, at 42.
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by the fact that "an administrative decision may be based upon hearsay
which is appraised by an expert who testifies, but not upon hearsay
which is appraised by an expert who decides!"' 9 4  The third criticism
which attacks the position that there necessarily exists a nexus between
the credibility of evidence and the exclusionary rules as mechanically
applied, is a more refined statement of Wigmore's criticism that the
exclusionary rules only determine the type of evidence to be considered
and not the process for evaluating it.195 Finally, the fourth criticism
(really a suggestion), like the third, attacks the "mechanical prohibi-
tion" of the rule and therefore suggests a rule more tailored in applica-
tion. Thus, the mechanical operation of the rule "assures that the find-
ings will be at variance with the truth more often than they would be
if the reliability were judged in light of all the circumstances."' 0
These, then, are the major criticisms of the legal residuum rule. To
some extent, they all point toward a more relative and less absolute
method of evaluating uncorroborated hearsay. The question remains,
however, just how flexible can the rules become without upsetting the
desired balance between protection of individual interests on the one
hand and administrative efficiency on the other?
V. Dui PRocEss: TiE CONSTITUTIONAL DIMENSION
The antecedent remarks have for the most part centered around the
state of the law mandated by judicial fiat or statutory prescription.
Here, the Constitution is the touchstone. Stepping outside the confines
of judicial pronouncements and statutory ambiguities can prove benefi-
cial, if for no other reason than to provide an overview of the more
194. Residuum Rule, supra note 163, at 4. Wasn't it precisely that "incongruous
result" that the Court in Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389 (1971), refused to sanction
when it held that the written reports of the physicians who examined the claimant were
sufficiently credible to sustain a finding? Since this kind of evidence is usually more
trustworthy than other kinds, "[c:ourts have recognized the reliability and probative
worth of written medical reports even in formal trials and, while acknowledging their
hearsay character, have admitted them as an exception to the hearsay rule." Id. at 405.
Of course, this factor in conjunction with others (see id. at 402-04, 406-09) produced
the rule handed down in Perales.
195. See note 185 supra. Like Wigmore before him, Professor Davis' analysis suggests
a more moderate-more reasoned-approach.
Those who reject the residuum rule would permit the agency and the reviewing
court to exercise a discretionary power to determine where the particular evidence
falls in the scale from the highest reliability to utter worthlessness. The residuum
rule is based upon the assumption that that determination can be made in a whole-
sale fashion without consideration of circumstances of particular cases.
Residuum Rule, supra note 163, at 4-5. Another statement of the same criticism can be
found in McCoRcK, supra note 21, at 848.
196. Residuum Rule, supra note 163, at 5.
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fundamental issues involved. Since constitutional principles may be
operative here, the standards they establish must to a large extent de-
velop the drift of the law in California. While state laws may add to
the list of rights guaranteed by the federal constitution, 9' they cannot
subtract from them. Accordingly, the general scope of the standard
or degree of procedural fairness called for will quite often depend upon
the constitutional dimension of the particular problem.
The analytical method invoked in this segment of the Comment re-
quires a discussion of certain broad due process issues in order to es-
tablish the proper foundation for a constitutional inquiry into the hear-
say question. Essentially, the ultimate constitutional issue relates to
the legal status of an entitlement, if any, to a hearing in the first in-
stance; thereafter, upon the evidentiary breadth of the procedures con-
stitutionally required; and finally, upon the specific nexus between the
due process mandate as it relates to the issue of uncorroborated hear-
say.
A. The Emergence of a New Constitutional Trend
The Supreme Court's 1970 decision in Goldberg v. Kelly 98 is un-
questionably one of the most significant civil cases in recent years.
The precedents it established have formed the basis of a host of signifi-
cant due process cases since decided by the high court. 99 The impact
197. Cf. Skelly v. State Personnel Bd., 15 Cal. 3d 194, - P.2d -, - Cal. Rptr. -
(1975); People v. Brisendine, 13 Cal. 3d 528, 531 P.2d 1099, 119 Cal. Rptr. 315
(1975). The scope of this Comment does not permit an analysis of the applicable
California constitutional mandates nor the holdings of the state courts interpreting the
federal constitutional requirements. See generally note 200 infra.
198. 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
199. See, e.g., North Georgia Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc., 419 U.S. 601
(1975) (garnishment procedures); Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975) (ten-day
student suspension); Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974) (prison disciplinary pro-
ceeding); Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600. (1974) (sequestration pro-
cedures); Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134 (1974) (government employee dismissal);
Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593 (1972) (nonrenewal of a nontenured state teacher's
contract); Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972) (parole revocation procedures);
Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972) (replevin procedures); Richardson v. Wright, 405
U.S. 208 (1972) (Social Security benefits suspension and termination); Bell v. Burson,
402 U.S. 535 (1971) (motor vehicle registration and driver's license suspension);
Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389 (1971) (application procedures for Social Security
benefits); Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433 (1971) (posting laws and liquor
sale prohibition); Wheeler v. Montgomery, 397 U.S. 280 (1970) (state welfare termina-
tion provisions) (companion case of Goldberg). See O'Neil, Of Justice Delayed and
Justice Denied: The Welfare Prior Hearing Cases, 1970 S. Or. Rlv. 161; Rogge, An
Overview of Administrative Due Process (pts. 1-2), 19 VmL. L. Rav. 1-81, 197-276
(1973); Note, Due Process and Statutory Limitations on AFDC Recoupment
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of Goldberg has likewise had its effect on California decisional law.2 °0
Goldberg v. Kelly involved the due process requirements that come
into play in the welfare termination context. In Goldberg, the appli-
cable state and federal laws required prior notice 201 as well as a post-
termination hearing202 which permitted the recipient to "confront and
cross-examine the witnesses against him. '203  Despite these procedural
protections, the Court held that the deprivation of the appellees' statu-
tory entitlements-whether labeled as a privilege or a right20 -re-
Procedures, 74 COLUM. L. Rav. 1464, 1466-69 (1974). See generally Friendly, "Some
Kind of Hearing," 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1267 passim (1975) [hereinafter cited as
Friendly].
200. Some of the more prominent cases include: Skelly v. State Personnel Bd., 15
Cal. 194, - P.2d -, - Cal. Rptr. - (1975) (civil service employee reward practice
held violative of due process); Beaudreau v. Sup. Ct., 14 Cal. 3d 448, 454-65, 121 Cal.
Rptr. 585, 588-96, 535 P.2d 713, 716-24 (1975) (statute requiring plaintiffs to file a
written undertaking prior to any hearing as to the merits of plaintiffs' action held uncon-
stitutional); Guerrero v. Carleson, 9 Cal. 3d 808, 810-11, 512 P.2d 833, 834, 109 Cal.
Rptr. 201, 202 (1973) (Tobiner, J., dissenting) (Goldberg requires that welfare reduc-
tion or termination notices be written in Spanish for those recipients known to be literate
primarily in that language); Rios v. Cozens, 7 Cal. 3d 792, 799-800, 499 P.2d 979, 984,
103 Cal. Rptr. 299, 304 (1972), vacated and remanded sub nor. Department of Motor
Vehicles v. Rios, 410 U.S. 425 (1973) (automobile licensee held entitled to a hearing
prior to suspension of license); Blair v. Pitchess, 5 Cal. 3d 258, 280-81, 486 P.2d 1242,
1258, 96 Cal. Rptr. 42, 58 (1971) (claim and delivery procedures held violative of due
process requirements); Mooney v. Pickett, 4 Cal. 3d 669, 675, 483 P.2d 1231, 1234-35,
94 Cal. Rptr. 279, 282-83 (1971) (applicant challenge of General Assistance eligibility
policy); McCullough v. Terzian, 2 Cal. 3d 647, 653-56, 470 P.2d 4, 7-10, 87 Cal. Rptr.
195, 199-201 (1970) (Application of due process standards in welfare termination pro-
ceeding). Valenzuele v. Board of Civil Serv. Comm'rs, 40 Cal. App. 3d 557, 563-64,
115 Cal. Rptr. 105, 106-07 (1974) (determination of the proper standard of review
where Civil Service employee was threatened with loss of employment); In re Castaneda,
34 Cal. App. 3d 825, 832, 110 Cal. Rptr. 385, 389 (1973) (preliminary hearing on
parole revocation required).
201. 397 U.S. 254, 257-58 (1970).
202. Id. at 259.
203. Id. at 260. The recipient was also entitled to a personal appearance, an offer of
oral evidence, and a record of the hearing. Id.
204. Id. at 262. The "rights-privilege" distinction is no longer of constitutional
significance in this area of the law. See Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 148-52 (1974)
(Powell, J., concurring in part and concurring in the result); Board of Regents v. Roth,
408 U.S. 564, 571 n.9 (1972); Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 482 (1972); Bell v.
Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 539 (1971); ADMINisTRATIvE LAW TExT, supra note 1, at 180-86;
Van Aistyne, The Demise of the Right-Privilege Distinction in Constitutional Law, 81
IiARv. L. 1Ev. 1439 (1968). But see Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 211 (1974)
(Marshall, J., dissenting). See also Skelly v. State Personnel Bd., 15 Cal. 3d 194, -
P.2d -, - Cal. Rptr. - (1975). Of course, the "rights" question necessarily raises still
other more fundamental questions-questions which are perhaps better suited for the
political scientist to consider. See generally Schrock & Welsh, Up From Calandra:
The Exclusionary Rule as a Constitutional Requirement, 59 MUnN. L. Rev. 251, 273 &
n.72 (1974).
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quired a due process hearing prior to termination. 20 5
The next phase of Justice Brennan's majority opinion centered
around consideration of the "minimum procedural safeguards" de-
manded by "rudimentary due process."210 While the Court noted that
"the pre-termination hearing need not take the form of a judicial or
quasi-judicial trial, ' '207 it nevertheless proceeded to enunciate, and
thereby require, almost every "essential element of a 'trial.' "208 The
ten procedural safeguards 20 9 that the Goldberg Court required indi-
205. 397 U.S. at 264-66. This rule applies with almost equal force to vested interests
which are "discontinued or suspended." See Wheeler v. Montgomery, 397 U.S. 254, 282
(1970); O'Neil, Of Justice Delayed and Justice Denied: The Welfare Prior Hearing
Cases, 1970 S. Cr. Rav. 161, 177.
Central to the Court's decision to grant a pre-termination hearing was its reliance on a
balancing of interests formula. The Court, relying on Justice Frankfurter's statement in
Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 168 (1951) (Frankfurt-
er, I., concurring) declared:
The extent to which procedural due process must be afforded the recipient is influ-
enced by the extent to which he may be "condemned to suffer grievous loss"....
397 U.S. at 262-63; see Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433, 437 (1971). Coupled
with the preceding factor, the Court considered "whether the recipient's interest in
avoiding [the threatened] loss outweigh[ed] the governmental interest in summary
adjudication." 397 U.S. at 263. The Court also added:
[C]onsideration of what procedures due process may require under any given set
of circumstances must begin with a determination of the precise nature of the gov-
ernment function involved as well as of the private interest that has been affected
by governmental action.
Id., quoting Cafeteria & Restaurant Workers Local 473 v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 895
(1961).
After applying those standards of evaluation, the Court concluded that the recipient's
need of daily subsistence (see 397 U.S. at 264) outweighed the "governmental interests
in conserving fiscal and administrative resources." Id. at 265-66; see Kelly v. Wyman,
294 F. Supp. 893, 901 (S.D.N.Y. 1968). Even Justice Black in his dissent observed:
I would be surprised if the weighing process did not compel the conclusion that
termination without full judicial review would be unconscionable. After all, at each
step. . . the issue is only one of weighing the government's pocketbook against the
actual survival of the recipient, and surely that balance must always tip in favor
of the individual.
397 U.S. at 278. But see Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 583-84 (1975). Accordingly, here
due process was held to require a hearing prior to the termination of any benefits.
206. 397 U.S. at 266-71.
207. Id. at 266.
208. ADMINISTRATIVE LAw TExT, supra note 1, at 170. Professor Davis' comments on
Goldberg merit repeating:
How can an "evidentiary hearing" "not take the form of a judicial or quasi-judicial
trial"? By the rest of its opinion the Court seemed to demonstrate that it cannot,
for the procedural rights it required include[d] [almost all of the essential elements
of a trial.] ...Do not the items the Court required add up to the opposite of
its statement that the hearing "need not take the form of a judicial or quasi-judicial
trial"? What can be the meaning of a "trial" if not essentially the sum of the items
the Court required?
Id. at 169-70. See also K. DAvis, ADMINISTRATm LAW: CASEs - Txr - PRoBLEMS 288
(1973).
209. 397 U.S. at 267-71; see Comment, California Welfare Fair Hearings: An
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cated what it believed to be the essential elements of a "meaningful"
hearing.210 Accordingly, it held that "a recipient [must] have . . .
an effective opportunity to defend by confronting any adverse wit-
nesses .. . ."I" Later in the opinion, Justice Brennan reiterated:
"In almost every setting where important decisions turn on questions
of fact, due process requires an opportunity to confront and cross-
examine adverse witnesses."' 12
What has been said suggests a rule applicable to the sufficiency of
uncorroborated hearsay in certain administrative proceedings. A rea-
sonable application of the Goldberg requirements would suggest that
since uncorroborated hearsay necessarily denies the party threatened
the "opportunity to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses," it
therefore deprives that party of the constitutional protection to which
he or she is entitled. Thus the Court observed:
[W]here credibility and veracity are at issue, as they must be in many
termination proceedings, written submissions are a wholly unsatisfactory
basis for decision. 213
This last observation suggests the inadequacy of hearsay,214 and par-
ticularly, of uncorroborated hearsay,21 5 to sustain a finding-at least in
Goldberg-like situations. Some pre-Goldberg California cases have
expressly held just that.21 6 Of course, such an interpretation corre-
Adequate Remedy?, 5 U.C.D.L. REv. 542 (1972).
210. The Court noted that "[tihe hearing must be 'at a meaningful time and in a
meaningful manner."' 397 U.S. at 267, quoting Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552
(1965).
211. 397 U.S. at 267-68 (emphasis added); see Wheeler v. Montgomery, 397 U.S.
280, 281-82 (1970). Where a party adversely affected is denied an "effective opportuni-
ty" to confront adverse witnesses, such an omission, coupled with the denial of the
right to present oral evidence, is "fatal to the constitutional adequacy of the procedures."
397 U.S. at 268.
212. 397 U.S. at 269 (emphasis added); see id. at 270.
213. Id. (emphasis added).
214. Such may not be the case where a hearsay exception is present. This seems
consistent with the Court's statement that
the pre-termination hearing has one function only-to produce an initial determina-
tion of the validity of the . . . grounds for discontinuance of payments in order
to protect a recipient against an erroneous termination of his benefits.
Id. at 267 (emphasis added); see note 271 infra. To the extent that the particular hear-
say evidence falls into one of the hearsay exceptions, its evidentiary value is likely to
be credible enough to satisfy Goldberg's due process requirements.
215. But see Peters v. United States, 408 F.2d 719 (Ct. Cl. 1969). An analysis of the
Peters case can be found in 48 N.C.L. REv. 608 (1970).
216. Armistead v. City of Los Angeles, 152 Cal. App. 2d 319, 313 P.2d 127 (1957).
"[Aln order of an administrative board based upon incompetent hearsay evidence
contravenes due process and cannot stand." Id. at 324, 313 P.2d at 130; Dyer v. Watson,




lates the right to "confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses" with
the inadequacy of mere hearsay evidence to sustain a finding. Cer-
tainly, where "credibility and veracity are at issue" mere hearsay will
be insufficient. But what if they're not? That is, what about uncorrob-
orated hearsay which would be admissible over objection in a civil
proceeding? In those instances, the Court's pronouncements 217 addi-
tionally suggest that due process fray not require confrontation and
cross-examination where the hearsay offered is found to be trust-
worthy.
In fairness to the Court's attempt to fashion a rule in a difficult area
of the law, it is important to recall the particular context in which the
Court formulated the rules that it did. These rules should not be taken
to be absolute maxims applicable to every administrative proceeding.
After all, the procedure to be applied in each case will stand or fall
depending on the extent to which it protects the party adversely af-
fected against the erroneous deprivation21 s of important rights.2 19
Certainly, some procedural safeguards will always be mandatory; others
depend on the particular right involved and the procedures fashioned
to protect that right.
Not long after the Goldberg decision, the Supreme Court, in Rich-
ardson v. Peraes,220 availed itself of the opportunity of deciding "what
procedural due process requires with respect to examining physicians'
reports in a social security disability claim hearing. '2 21 Statutory pro-
visions entitled the claimant to an informal hearing where any evidence
could be received, despite the fact that it would be inadmissible under
courtroom rules of evidence.2 2  The conflict arose when the hearsay
medical reports of four physicians were introduced over objection and
thereafter were relied upon as the basis for denying the applicants
claim.223 These facts were significant because, to a large extent, they
determined what minimum procedural safeguards the Court would re-
217. See text accompanying note 213 supra.
218. Consider the informal procedures that won judicial approval in Goss v. Lopez,
419 U.S. 565, 582-84 (1975); Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600, 616-20 (1974);
Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 150-55 (1974). But see id. at 166-67 (Powell, J.,
concurring in part and concurring in the result in part).
219. See note 204 supra.
220. 402 U.S. 389 (1971). An insightful discussion and analysis of the Perales case
can be found in ADMINISTRATVE LAW TnxT, supra note 1, at 281-84.
221. 402 U.S. at 402 (emphasis added).
222. Id. at 400.
223. Id. at 395.
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quire. Thus Justice Blackmun's majority opinion emphasized the im-
portance of the kind of case before the Court when he stated:
Perales relies heavily on the Court's holding and statements in Gold-
berg v. Kelly . . . particularly the comment that due process requires
notice "and an effective opportunity to defend by confronting any ad-
verse witnesses. . .... Kelly, however, had to do with termination of
AFDC benefits. . . . It also concerned a situation. . . "where credi-
bility and veracity are at issue, as they must be in many termination
proceedings."
The Perales proceeding is not the same.
22 4
Obviously, then, the "application-termination" distinction played no
small role in the outcome of the case. The net effect of this distinction
is that "stricter procedural protections [will] be required in proced-
ings for the termination rather than the initiation of benefits." '22
The kind of evidence that was offered against the claimant was also
instrumental in the formulation of the rule established in Perales. This
evidence consisted of medical reports228 which as a class of evidence
are generally held to be fairly trustworthy.227  In addition, the reports
were essentially consistent with each other in their general findings. 228
Unlike Goldberg, the specter of questionable credibility and veracity
was not present.220 It has thus been observed:
Insofar as the chief purpose of cross-examination is to assure reliability,
it would make sense not to extend the right of confrontation in adminis-
trative proceedings to the point of preventing use of evidence which is
generally highly reliable.
2 30
224. Id. at 406-07 (citations omitted and emphasis added). Those who laud the
Perales holding as establishing a new general rule applicable to all kinds of administra-
tive proceedings seldom take note of the significance of the "application-termination"
distinction.
225. The Supreme Court, 1970 Term, 85 HtAiv. L. REv. 3, 330 (1971) (emphasis
added). It was also noted that:
Reliance interests are often greater when a change is sought in the status quo. Yet
the needs of the claimant may often be just as great in initiation proceedings, par-
ticularly where subsistence benefits are at issue. Moreover, the Kelly Court seemed
to indicate that the procedural requirements it set out as part of "rudimentary due
process" were the minimum level of procedural safeguards tolerable when "statutory
entitlement" was at issue.
Id. (footnote omitted); cf. Bixby v. Pierno, 4 Cal. 3d 130, 131, 161, 481 P.2d 242, 264,
93 Cal. Rptr. 234, 256 (1971) (Mosk, J., concurring).
226. 402 U.S. at 395.
227. But see The Supreme Court, 1970 Term, 85 HAnv. L. RPv. 3, 330 n.31 (1971).
See generally Haviland & Glomb, The Disability Insurance Benefits Program and Low
Income Claimants in Appalachia, 73 W. VA. L. Rav. 109, 117-37 (1971).
228. 402 U.S. at 404.
229. The Supreme Court, 1970 Term, 85 HARV. L. Rav. 3, 330 n.31 (1971).
230. Id. at 331.
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That is precisely where the Perales Court drew the line.
Finally, and by way of reiteration,"' the Perales decision empha-
sized the Court's willingness to consider certain kinds of uncorrobo-
rated hearsay as sufficient evidence whenever the claimant fails to ex-
ercise a right to subpoena witnesses.2"' The fact that this option was
available and the petitioner failed to exercise it likewise had its effect
on the outcome of the case. This factor, more than any other perhaps,
permitted the Court to sustain the board's decision. As one noted
commentator has remarked:
The Court's reasoning emphasized that the claimant's failure to request
subpenas precluded him from complaining that he was denied the
rights of confrontation and cross-examination.
2 3
This emphasis on the significance of the subpoena opportunity served
another more important purpose. It demonstrated the Court's unwill-
ingness to reject the legal residuum rule.23 '  Given the other factors
stressed herein, it is important to note that the Perales Court limited
its decision. The law applied to that context indicates what due proc-
ess guarantees the Court found necessary in order to assure a "mean-
ingful" hearing.
The application-termination distinction is thus crucial because of the
effect it has on the subpoena issue. Since the claimant is the "moving
party," the burden of proof is on that person. It requires the claimant
to invoke the subpoena power in order to later attack the sufficiency
of the evidence introduced by the non-moving party. However, it is
not clear, even under Perales, that the failure to exercise this power
would not vitiate a petitioner's attack upon the sufficiency of uncor-
roborated hearsay in a termination or suspension proceeding since the
burden does not rest on that party. In such proceedings due process
would seem to compel the moving party to come forth with non-hearsay
evidence in order to assure the party threatened the "opportunity to
cross-examine adverse witnesses." The fact that such would seem to
be the case-and that it logically should be so--does not guarantee that
the Court will acknowledge its soundness in the future. In this respect,
it should be noted that the Perales Court rather than emphasizing the
nature of the threatened harm as did Goldberg, emphasized instead the
kind of evidence presented. To that extent, then, Perales built upon
231. See text accompanying notes 113-21 supra.
232. 402 U.S. at 402.
233. ADMnusTnAuVE LAW TExT, supra note 1, at 281 (footnote omitted).
234. Id. at 281-82.
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Goldberg's pronouncements regarding the trustworthiness of certain
kinds of hearsay evidence. 35
If anything, the Goldberg and Perales holdings strongly suggest sev-
eral relevant guidelines: one, that while the legal residuum rule has
not been rejected,22 6 the Court is not likely to follow blanket or me-
chanical rules; two, the nature of the proceeding will often determine
the standard of due process to be employed; three, the agency's ability
to fashion rules which will adequately protect a person's right will be
a significant factor upon review; four, the kind of hearsay evidence of-
fered must be evaluated in terms of its trustworthiness, particularly so
when there is no corroborating evidence; five, the denial of the right
of cross-examination is not likely to win judicial approval unless the
moving party has knowingly refused to exercise the right to subpoena
adverse witnesses.
Collectively, these two cases indicate that neither absolute rules
which deny the possible sufficiency of certain hearsay evidence nor
token procedural niceties which effectively deny a party a fair and
meaningful hearing, are likely to satisfy the due process requirements.
A procedure must be fashioned which is sufficiently flexible and just
to satisfy the requisite needs of all of the parties involved; these pro-
tections cannot exist in a vacuum.
B. The Evolving Due Process Doctrine
Although the Perales holding did not, strictly speaking, depart from
the rules enunciated in Goldberg, it did serve notice that the Court was
still undecided as to what specific procedural requirements the due
process clause mandated-indecision that was to manifest itself in lat-
er cases. 237  Within less than one month after Perales was decided,
the Supreme Court rendered its decision in Bell v. Burson2 3 -- the
235. See text following note 216 supra.
236. It should be noted, however, that the "legal evidence" requirement of this rule is
quite tenuous in the context of Supreme Court adjudication since "legal evidence" is
essentially anything the Court says it is. The rule is qualified by the Court's willingness
to acknowledge the sufficiency of hearsay evidence found to be trustworthy.
237. See, e.g., North Georgia Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc., 419 U.S. 601 (1975);
Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600 (1974); Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134
(1974).
238. 402 U.S. 535 (1971). The case involved the summary (see Freedman, Summary
Action By Administrative Agencies, 40 U. Cm. L. REV. 1, 4, 25 (1972)) license
suspension of an uninsured motorist who was involved in an automobile accident and
thereafter failed to post the statutory security deposit. 402 U.S. at 536-37 n.1. The state's
"irrebutable presumption" (see Comment, The Irrebuttable Presumption Doctrine In The
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driver's license suspension case. At first glance, the rule fashioned by
the Court seemed to follow the same procedural pattern enunciated in
Goldberg. Justice Brennan, the author of Goldberg, reiterated in his
majority opinion that "due process need not take the form of a full
adjudication," 239 but that, nevertheless, the "hearing required by the
Due Process Clause must be 'meaningful.' "240 The end result was a
constitutionally mandated hearing which included "meaningful" pro-
cedural guarantees short of full adjudication. Burson, unlike Goldberg,
did not bother to elaborate which aspects of a full hearing due proc-
ess required.241 Yet lurking in the Court's silence was the implica-
tion that full adjudication, including the opportunity to cross-examine
adverse witnesses, "need not be provided in every case where a pre-
termination hearing of some kind is required ... "I"
Throughout the 1971 Term-and with a handicapped tribunal243 -
the Supreme Court struggled to carve out new rules from the broad
outline holdings of earlier cases. Initial attempts to extend Goldberg
were temporarily stifled.2 44 By the summer of 1972, the Court handed
down Fuentes v. Shevin 2'1--one of the forerunners of a string of sum-
mary prejudgment seizure cases 24 6 which applied the Goldberg prior
hearing doctrine to prejudgment replevin cases. 247 The Courts opinion
offered little in the way of any new elaboration upon specific pro-
cedural requirements; it noted only that
[s]ince the essential reason for the requirement of a prior hearing is
Supreme Court, 87 HIv. L. REv. 1535 (1974)) denied the licensee the opportunity to
prove his "innocence." 402 U.S. at 536-37.
239. 402 U.S. at 540; see notes 210-11 supra.
240. 402 U.S. at 541-42, quoting Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965); see
note 207 supra.
241. 402 U.S. at 542.
242. Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 200-01 (1974) (White, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part).
243. The untimely deaths of Justices Hugo Black and John Harlan required the Court
to proceed with a seven-man tribunal for a certain portion of the 1971 term. On the
significance of the absent votes, see North Georgia Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc., 419
U.S. 601, 615-19 (1975) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
244. See Richardson v. Wright, 405 U.S. 208, 209 (1972) (Social Security termina-
tion action where the Court in a per curiamn decision refused to rule on the merits of the
case due to the absence of a case or controversy); K. DAvIs, AoDmnqsTTv LAW:
CASES - T=Xr - PRoni.nMs 289 (1973); Neyerhoff & Mishkin, Application of Goldberg v.
Kelly Hearing Requirements to Termination of Social Security Benefits, 26 STAN. L.
REV. 549 (1974).
245. 407 U.S. 67 (1972).
246. See North Georgia Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc., 419 U.S. 601 (1975);
Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600 (1974).
247. 407 U.S. at 96-97. A "narrow" 4-3 decision. See note 243 supra.
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to prevent unfair and mistaken deprivations of property, however, it is
axiomatic that the hearing must provide a real test.
248
While extending the prior hearing doctrine, the Fuentes Court chose to
speak in generalities when it came to procedural safeguards; the opin-
ion itself never disclosed just what the limits of the "real test" were.
The first post-Goldberg case to go beyond the general language of
the preceding cases was Morrissey v. Brewer.240  Addressing itself to
parole revocation procedures,2 50 Chief Justice Burger's opinion held
that, after balancing the respective interests, 251 there must be an oppor-
tunity for a hearing prior to the final decision or revocation; =2 and that
the hearing must include, among other requirements253 the "right to
confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses (unless the hearing of-
ficer specifically finds good cause for not allowing confrontation)."' 5 4
248. 407 U.S. at 97; see note 62 supra.
249. 408 U.S. 471 (1972); see Cassou, The Morrissey Maelstrom: Recent Develop-
ments in California Parole and Probation Revocations, 9 U.S.F.L. REv. 43 (1974);
Tobriner & Cohen, How Much Process is "Due"? Paroles and Prisoners, 25 HASTINGS
L.J 801 (1974); Note, An Endorsement of Due Process Reform in Parole Revocation:
Morrissey v. Brewer, 6 Loy. L.A.L. REv. 157 (1973); Note, Morrissey v. Brewer:
Procedural Due Process Rights at Parole Revocation Hearings, 1 WEST. ST. U.L. REv.
230 (1973).
250. While the Court permitted more informal procedures at the preliminary hearing
stage, 408 U.S. at 483-87, it nevertheless held that,
on request of the parolee, persons who have given adverse information on which
parole revocation is to be based are to be made available for questioning in his
presence. However, if the hearing officer determines that the informant would be
subjected to risk of harm if his identity were disclosed, he need not be subjected to
confrontation and cross-examination.
Id. at 487 (emphasis added).
251. Id. at 481-84.
252. Id. at 487-88.
253. See id. at 489.
254. Id. Regarding the "good cause" requirement necessary for denial of cross-
examination, see note 250 supra. Moreover, in Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 560
(1974), the Court noted:
If confrontation and cross-examination of those furnishing evidence against the
inmate were to be allowed as a matter of course, as in criminal trials, there would
be considerable potential for havoc inside the prison walls.
Id. at 567. Such due process rights, said Justice White, "are not ...universally ap-
plicable to all hearings." Id. But see id. at 584-85 (Marshall, J., dissenting in part).
That qualification is particularly applicable to prison disciplinary proceedings where
"[e]onfrontation and cross-examination present [dangerous] hazards to institutional in-
terests." Id. at 567 (footnote omitted); id. at 562, 568-69. Yet the McDonnell holding
is a lone one-the particular circumstances of the case and the "balance" to be struck
therein required, in the Court's estimation, limitation of the respective due process safe-
guards. The opinion therefore emphasizes the unique nature of the case then before the
Court:
Viewed in this light it is immediately apparent that one cannot automatically apply
procedural rules designed for free citizens in an open society, or for parolees or
probationers under only limited restraints, to the very different situation presented
by a disciplinary proceeding in a state prison.
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Despite the strong language of the opinion, the Court emphasized that
its requirements were not to be equated with those of a criminal pro-
ceeding 55 and that "the process should be flexible enough to consider
evidence including letters, affidavits, and other material that would not
be admissible in an adversary criminal trial."2 56 Given the Court's ex-
plicit acknowledgement of the right to confront and cross-examine ad-
verse witnesses, its latter statements can be interpreted to mean that,
while hearsay evidence may be admissible, it can only sustain a finding
where it is used to support non-hearsay testimony pertaining to the
same factual issue.2 57 However, such an interpretation might unduly
strain the meaning of the Court's pronouncements. A better explana-
tion would suggest the Court's willingness to accept hearsay evidence
of an inherently reliable nature even if it is the only evidence offered
Id. at 560 (emphasis added). Additionally, the Court noted:
In striking the balance that the Due Process Clause demands, however, we think
the major consideration militating against adopting the full range of procedures sug-
gested by Morrissey for alleged parole violations is the very different stake the
State has in the structure and content of the prison disciplinary hearing.
Id. at 561.
Clearly, then, the holding in McDonnell is one of "very" limited application. Never-
theless, even that holding may have to give way to future due process challenges: "As
the nature of the prison disciplinary process changes in future years, circumstances may
then exist which will require further consideration and reflection of this Court." Id.
at 572. See also id. at 568. Even so, the majority opinion seems analytically deficient
even under the present circumstances. See id. at 582-90 (Marshall, J., dissenting in
part). If the Court were so inclined, procedures could be fashioned which would insure
a more equitable constitutional "balance." See id. at 590 (Marshall, J., dissenting in
part); id. at 595 (Douglas, J., dissenting in part, concurring in the result in part);
Friendly, supra note 199, at 1286 n.101.
Given the restrictive character of the McDonnell holding, it is somewhat surprising
that Judge Friendly should remark: "'he absolutes of Greene v. McElroy and of Gold-
berg v. Kelly with respect to confrontation arguably have now been ended by Wolff v.
McDonnell." Friendly, supra note 199, at 1285 (footnotes omitted). To the extent the
Goldberg Court recognized a balancing of interests standard (397 U.S. at 262-63), its
holding is not necessarily, if at all, inconsistent with McDonnell. The fact that the full
panorama of rights guaranteed under Goldberg did not extend to McDonnell is owing
to the different nature of the latter case. See Friendly, supra note 199, at 1282 n.80.
The confrontation requirement is only "absolute" where the "balance" favors the party
adversely affected or threatened. Despite his rather sweeping remarks to the contrary
(see id. at 1285-86), Judge Friendly concedes that "prison cases are doubtless the strong-
est ones for dispensing with an absolute requirement of confrontation and cross-exami-
nation. . . ." Id. at 1286 (emphasis added). In what respect, then, does McDonnell
even "arguably" call to an end the rule fashioned in Goldberg? At best the question
as to what adjudicative entitlements due process requires beyond mere "rudimentary
procedures" is unresolved by the Court. See id. at 1282 n.80.
255. 408 U.S. at 489.
256. Id. (emphasis added).
257. Cf. text accompanying note 93 supra.
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by the moving party. Such an interpretation is in accord with the
pronouncements of Goldberg and Perales discussed earlier.20 Addi-
tionally, the due process standard as interpreted here provides a flex-
ible procedure similar to that of California Government Code section
11513(c) and unlike the rigid character of the pure residuum rule.
25
Prior to April of 1974, then, a constitutional doctrine was emerging
which provided that once an interest was found to be within the four-
teenth amendment's liberty or property clause,2 G0 due process required
a hearing at some time. Additionally, if, on balance, the interest ad-
versely threatened proved paramount, the holder of that interest was
entitled to a pre-deprivation hearing. 0 1 Where the interest was found
to be substantially important, an evidentiary hearing, which included
the right to cross-examination, would be provided. 20 1  This last right,
as earlier noted, is guaranteed where "credibility and veracity are at
issue.,
263
Recently, the Court-or at least three of its members-has signaled
its willingness to retreat from the pre-hearing doctrine enunciated in
Goldberg.164  Should this practice become the trend, the constitutional
258. See text accompanying notes 216, 217 & 235 supra.
259. See text accompanying notes 95 & 96 supra; cf. note 171 supra.
260. See Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 599-603 (1972); Board of Regents v.
Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 576-78 (1972); Stewart, The Reformation of American Administra-
tive Law, 88 HAv. L. REv. 1669, 1719-22 (1975).
261. Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972); Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535 (1971).
262. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972); Wheeler v. Montgomery, 397 U.S.
280 (1970); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
263. See text accompanying notes 216, 217, 235 & 257 supra.
264. With the advent of Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134 (1974), the "Nixon Court"
(see L. LEvy, AGAINST THE LAW 32, 48 (1974), quoting N.Y. Times, Sept. 24, 1972, at
20, col. 3. See also LEvY, supra at 441) demonstrated its willingness to retreat from the
principles established in Goldberg. The dismissal, for "cause" of a nonprobationary
federal employee, provided the catalyst for a departure from earlier precedents. See Perry
v. Sidermann, 408 U.S. 593 (1972); Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972);
Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972); Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535 (1971); Wheeler v.
Montgomery, 397 U.S. 280 (1970); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970). Pending his
appeal to the Civil Service Commission (see 5 U.S.C. § 7701 (1970); 5 C.F.R. §
771.101-.226 (1974)), the employee was discharged without pay. 416 U.S. at 141. The
governing statute, while providing for prior notice and an opportunity to respond in
writing to the charges, did not mandate a pre-discharge hearing. The statute provides in
relevant part:
(b) An individual in the competitive service whose removal or suspension without
pay is sought is entitled to reasons in writing and to-
(1) notice of the action sought and of any charges preferred against him;
(2) a copy of the charges;
(3) a reasonable time for filing a written answer to the charges, with affidavits;
and
(4) a written decision on the answer at the earliest practicable date.
Examination of witnesses, trial, or hearing is not required but may be provided
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dimension of the hearsay issue would most likely fade with it. A more
favorable omen has surfaced in the most recent due process case, Goss
in the discretion of the individual directing the removal or suspension without pay.
Copies of the charges, the notice of hearing, the answer, the reasons for and the
order of removal or suspension without pay, and also the reasons for reduction in
grade or pay, shall be made a part of the records of the employing agency, and,
on request, shall be furnished to the individual affected and to the Civil Service
Commission.
5 U.S.C. § 7501 (1970). An evidentiary trial-type hearing ripened into a statutory
entitlement only at the appellate stage of the proceeding. 416 U.S. at 145-48 nn.14-18.
Should the employee be reinstated on appeal, provision was made for certain back pay
allotments. Id. at 146-48 n.16.
The Court rendered five separate opinions. (The plurality opinion was written by
Justice Rehnquist with Chief Justice Burger and Justice Stewart concurring. Justice
Powell filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the result in part, in which
Justice Blackmun joined. Justice White followed with an opinion concurring in part and
dissenting in part. Not surprisingly, Justice Douglas filed a dissenting opinion. Finally,
Justice Marshall filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Douglas and Brennan
joined.) The plurality opinion in a somewhat novel-perhaps even suspect-fashion
held: "Here the property interest which appellee had in his employment was itself
conditioned by the procedural limitations which had accompanied the grant of that
interest." Id. at 155. The Court had stated earlier that
where the grant of a substantive right is inextricably intertwined with the limita-
tions of the procedures which are to be employed in determining that right, a liti-
gant in the position of the appellee must take the bitter with the sweet.
Id. at 153-54. Justices Rehnquist, Burger and Stewart were evidently content with
limiting all due process protections to statutory provisions-apparently the Constitution
was not to be considered as paramount.
That Justice Stewart did concur in the plurality opinion might seem odd to some.
Nevertheless, as one commentator has pointed out:
Stewart [Justice] was deeply mistrustful of judicially imposed limitations that cut
into government powers and was even reluctant to read the Bill of Rights as a set
of restraints on government except in the clearest cases.
L. LEvy, AGAINST THE LAw 40 (1974); see 4 THE JUsTIcEs oF Tm UNITED STATES
SUPREME COURT 2921, 2929-30 (L. Friedman & F. Israel eds. 1969). In this respect, it is
well to remember that:
Those... who controvert the principle, that the constitution is to be considered
in court, as a paramount law, are reduced to the necessity of maintaining that
courts must close their eyes on the constitution, and see only the law.
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 178 (1803).
It is not even altogether apparent from Justice Rehnquist's opinion whether or not "the
requisites of due process could equally have been satisfied had the law dispensed with
any hearing at all, whether pre-termination or post-termination." 416 U.S. at 178
(White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). But see Fuentes v. Shevin, 407
U.S. 67, 87 n.18 (1972). This judicial threesome had indeed drifted a long way from
the principles enunciated in Goldberg.
The alarm generated by the plurality opinion was tempered by the fact that six
members of the Court held that the appellee's entitlement could not be conditioned on a
statutory limitation of procedural due process protections. Id. at 166-67 (Powell, J.,
concurring in part and concurring in the result in part); id. at 185 (White, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part); id. at 211 (Marshall, J., dissenting). The balancing of
interests criteria thus remained the judicial test. See id. at 167-69 (Powell, J., concurring
in part and concurring in the result in part); id. at 193-96 (White, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part); id. at 217-26 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Nevertheless, only the
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v. Lope, 265 where a majority of the Court extended 200 the hearing
doctrine to a ten-day suspension of a public school student-a depriva-
tion. 7 not generally thought of as amounting to a "grievous loss" in
the Goldberg or Morrissey sense.208 However, the Court stopped short
of requiring a full evidentiary hearing consisting of an opportunity to
cross-examine adverse witnesses;20 9 it expressly limited its holding:
We should also make it clear that we have addressed ourselves solely
to the short suspension, not exceeding 10 days. Longer suspensions or
expulsions. . . . may require more formal procedures. Nor do we put
aside the possibility that in unusual situations, although involving only
a short suspension, something more than the rudimentary procedures
will be required.2
70
Implicit in the Court's language was the suggestion that given a situa-
tion where the deprivation was more substantial, more formal pro-
cedures, including the right to cross-examine adverse witnesses, would
be constitutionally required.
What emerges from the preceding examination are various due proc-
ess doctrines that the Court may invoke, depending upon the particu-
three dissenting justices held that due process required a full prior hearing. See id, at
226-27 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
At best, it is difficult to predict the precise impact that Arnett will have on future
cases. The tenor of the opinion suggests that only in the most compelling property or
liberty deprivation cases (e.g., Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972); Goldberg v.
Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970)) is due process likely to require a prior evidentiary hearing
with an opportunity to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses. While the Court
seemingly distinguished the governmental employee case from earlier deprivation cases
(416 U.S. at 155; id. at 169 (Powell, J., concurring in part and concurring in the result in
part); id. at 190-93 (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)), the
implication was that the Goldberg rationale was no longer operative.
Most recently, the California Supreme Court, in a unanimous opinion, rejected the
plurality approach in Arnett. See Skelly v. State Personnel Bd., 15 Cal. 3d 194, 211-12,
- P.2d -, - Cal. Rptr. - (1975).
265. 419 U.S. 565 (1975).
266. Id. at 581.
267. Id. at 567-69.
268. See id. at 587-89 (Powell, J., dissenting).
269. Id. at 583.
270. Id. at 584 (emphasis added). Writing for the court in Skelly v. State Personnel
Bd., 15 Cal. 3d 194, - P.2d -, - Cal. Rptr. - (1975). Justice Sullivan stated:
It is clear that due process does not require the state to provide [a "permanent
civil service"] employee with a full trial-type evidentiary hearing prior to the initial
taking of punitive action.
Id. at 209 (emphasis added). Nevertheless, he added, certain "preremoval safeguards"
must be afforded. Id. Despite the Skelly court's partial retreat from a full evidentiary
hearing prior to the "taking of punitive action," the court did, like Goss, acknowledge
that due process may, in certain instances, require "more formal proceedings." See id.
at 209; note 272 infra.
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lar case before the bar. Application of any one or combination of
these standards, will, in large part, depend upon the following four
factors: one, the substantiality and gravity of the threatened loss; two,
the nature of the applicable statutory provisions and the extent to which
they minimize the risk of erroneous deprivation;271 three, the particu-
lar kind of case before the Court; and four, the kind of evidence of-
fered. Given a particular set or combination of these factors, the op-
portunity to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses may or may
not be constitutionally mandated. The more the factual setting re-
sembles Goldberg-like situations, 2 72 the greater the likelihood that due
process will require more formal procedures, which would in turn have
an impact on the role of hearsay evidence in administrative proceed-
ings.
VI. SUGGESTED CONSIDERATIONS: METHODS OF EVALUATION
In any area with as many possible factual variables and procedural
considerations as this one, the task of formulating just and practical
guidelines seems somewhat "Promethean" in scope.2 73 The object is
to fashion a cure which is better than the ailment. Quite often lofty
formulae, "even good ones," must succumb to the workings of the real
world-verbum sapienti sat est.
Professor Kenneth Culp Davis-a "Titan" in his own era-has per-
haps more than others pioneered the way in this area of the law.
While others have made their respective contributions as well as sug-
gested approaches to this administrative problem,2 74 the most compre-
hensive proposals usually bear the Davis name.
271. See Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600 (1974); Catz & Robinson, Due
Process and Creditors Remedies: From Sniadach and Fuentes to Mitchell, North Georgia
and Beyond, 28 RuTGErs L. REv. 541, 563-64 (1975); Comment, The Evolving
Doctrine of Due Process In Debtor-Creditor Relations: From Sniadach to North Georgia
Finishing, 8 Loy. L.A.L. Rv. 339, 347-50 (1975).
272. See Eldridge v. Weinberger, 493 F.2d 1230 (4th Cir. 1974) cert. granted, 419
U.S. 1104 (1975) (Social Security medical disability benefits termination without prior
evidentiary hearing). See additionally the District Court opinion in Eldridge v. Wein-
berger, 361 F. Supp. 520, 525-28 (W.D. Va. 1973).
273. See Davis, An Approach to Problems of Evidence in the Administrative Process,
55 HARv. L. Rav. 364 (1942).
274. Of course, the contributions of Robert Benjamin should not be overlooked. In
1942 he observed that:
In some circumstances the denial of an opportunity to cross-examine the author of
a hearsay statement may vitiate a quasi-judicial determination. What those circum-
stances will be it is impossible to forecast with certainty. Wisely, I think, the courts
have refrained from generalization; and, moreover, the cases are few in which the
courts have reversed a quasi-judicial determination for lack of opportunity to cross-
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Two decades ago Davis propounded five factors to be considered in
determining the sufficiency of hearsay evidence.275  While each factor
merits consideration in its own right, it is important to remember the
collective significance of the several factors in order to properly evalu-
ate the merit of the suggestions presented. The following factors,
then, both in their independent and collective capacities, are relevant
examine a witness not present in person. While generalization from the decided
cases is thus impossible, it seems to me reasonable to expect that a quasi-judicial
determination will be reversed on this ground only if it appears that production for
cross-examination of the author of a hearsay statement would have been reasonably
practicable, and that in all the circumstances the refusal to produce him, or to allow
a reasonable opportunity for the party adversely affected to subpoena him, was
clearly unfair, and, probably, only if it appears further that the hearsay statement
in question has played a substantial part in the quasi-judicial determination.
BENJAMIN, supra note 81, at 198 (emphasis added and footnotes omitted). Perhaps
implicit in Mr. Benjamin's remarks - yet difficult to be quite certain of - is the
suggestion that the severity of the loss be considered alongside an evaluation of the
probable credibility of the hearsay evidence. He concludes:
[E]xcept where the affirmative considerations that I have just discussed are inap-
plicable or where there are serious practical difficulties, the normal practice should
be for the agency to produce for cross-examination, at least upon request, the author
of a report, certificate or other written statement received in evidence; and this
whether or not the statement in question is legally competent within the exception
to the hearsay rule.
Id. at 202 (footnote omitted). These suggestions have, among others, won Professor
Cooper's approval. 1 CooPER, supra note 10, at 374-79. Cooper has also expressed his
favor for the Revised Model State Act. Id. at 384. He thus remarks:
[The Act] bespeaks this ideal: the general practice in administrative proceedings
should be to follow the rules of evidence (withal applying them in the liberal way
that judges do when no jury is present). At the same time, the Revised Model Act
avoids any possibility that truth may be kept from the record, by permitting de-
parture from the general rule where such departure is necessary. This compromise
should go far toward eliminating any practice of basing findings on distortions and
half-truths-a danger which is always inherent in relying on letters and affidavits,
and which unhappily is sometimes encountered.
Id. at 387 (emphasis added).
In general accord is Professor Morris Forkosch's observation:
What must therefore be done is to classify hearsay into, say, "persuasive hearsay,"
and ' nonpersuasive hearsay," or some terms having like connotations, and see how
they fit into the totality of the picture ....
M. FoPioscu, A TREATISE ON ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 356 (1956) (footnote omitted).
Continuing with his analysis, Forkosch raises the question: "[Alre there any exceptions
to the hearsay evidence rule which, per se, are sufficient to support agency findings of
fact?" Id. at 357. His reply, which takes into account both "necessity" and the
"circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness," is a qualified-but assuring-yes. Id.
357-59, 383-433. The difficulty with Professor Forkosch's proposal is that it risks bring-
ing the evidentiary complexities of the courtroom into the quarters of informal adminis-
trative hearings. On the other hand, his concern for establishing categories of hearsay
based on their respective persuasiveness is a point well taken. The question is, how is it
to be done? Assuming that the evidentiary debate could generally be taken out of the
hearing room, and that fairly specific regulatory categories could be formulated, then
Professor Forkosch's suggestions could prove quite beneficial. See generally H. STEPH-
ENS, ADmINISTRATIVE TRIBUNALS AND THE RULES OF EVIDENCE (1933).
275. Residuum Rule, supra note 163, at 5-11.
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in determining when to find hearsay legally sufficient. These factors
include:
(a) the alternative to reliance on the incompetent evidence, if any;
(b) the state of the supporting and opposing evidence;
(c) the policy of the program being -administered and the consequences
of a decision either way;
(d) [the] importance or unimportance of the subject matter and con-
siderations of economy of government;
(e) the degree of efficacy of cross-examination with respect to particular
hearsay declarations.2 76
It is suggested that the use of these factors as a procedural yardstick
will permit the trier of fact to determine "whether or not [the] particu-
lar evidence should be relied upon. 277
The first factor amounts to a "what is in the basket" determination.
If better evidence is available, then it might well be unreasonable to
rely on mere hearsay. If on the other hand, no outside evidence is
obtainable, then hearsay may suffice.278  However, this formula in
some respects begs the question, since a determination of what consti-
tutes so called "better evidence" will quite often depend upon a full
recital of all the evidence. Likewise, some hearsay may seem compe-
tent until compared with live testimony. The availability or non-avail-
ability of the hearsay declarant does not itself assure the credibility or
noncredibility of the evidence presented; it merely substitutes the ex-
276. 2 ADMNISTRT IAw TREATISE, supra note 21, at 296. Professor Gellhorn has
adopted an approach which is quite similar - almost identical - to that of Professor
Davis'. See Gellhorn, Rules of Evidence and Official Notice in Formal Administrative
Hearings, 1971 DUKE L.J 1, 19-22. Gellhor's criteria include:
[1] What is the "nature" of the hearsay evidence... ?
[2] Is better evidence available? ...
t3] How important [or unimportant] is the subject matter in relation to the cost of
acquiring "better" evidence? ...
[4] How precise does the agency's factfinding need to be? ...
[5] What is the administrative policy behind the statute being enforced? ...








Gellhorn thus excludes Davis' cross-examination category while Davis excludes Gell-
horn's agency factfinding consideration.
277. It should be noted that Davis refers to those factors as "[s]ome of the circum-
stances that often need to be taken into account . ..." Residuum Rule, supra note 163,
at 5 (emphasis added). He thereby leaves open the possibility that there may be other
circumstances which may influence any given determination.
278. Id.
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pediency concern for the credibility one. As an independent criterion
of evaluation, this factor is inadequate, although as a factor for con-
sideration among others it could prove to be helpful.
The second factor involves consideration of the "whole circumstan-
tial setting," including the "quantity and quality of supporting and op-
posing evidence.' '2 79 Although this particular method of evaluation
seems reasonable enough, it might prove difficult to apply. In con-
sidering this factor, it should be recalled that the residuum rule neces-
sarily operates when non-hearsay "supporting evidence" is not pres-
ent 8o-the reason why some courts require a residuum of legal evi-
dence.28' If the supporting evidence is' hearsay, its credibility is also
open to challenge, especially where the hearsay builds upon hearsay.
Nevertheless, the quantity of the hearsay may lend credence to the re-
port given, so long as one hearsay report is not tainted by another. So
much for "supporting evidence," but what about the significance of
"opposing evidence"? Assuming that the requisite burden of proof has
been met by an offer of competent evidence, a failure to offer any re-
buttal evidence, or only "weak" evidence, perhaps should carry some
weight in determining whether or not the moving party's hearsay testi-
mony should be relied upon. The only problem is that too much may
have to be assumed, that is, the uncorroborated hearsay might not be
sufficient to satisfy the moving party's burden of proof. Where such
is the case, so called "opposing evidence" need not always be con-
sidered. (That is precisely what happened in Walker.2" 2) Where the
"opposing evidence" is considered it tends to confuse "quantum of evi-
dence" evaluations with "weight of evidence" determinations where the
latter is required. In either case, consideration of the opposing evi-
dence as an evaluation factor may prove difficult. The foregoing com-
ments should not, however, dispel confidence in the valid premise that
"quantity and quality" determinations are crucial here. What these
comments attempt to point out is that a "comparison evaluation" of the
evidence could raise other unforeseen problems.
The next factor considers the ends of operative program and the po.
tential impact of a given decision on the party's interest placed in
jeopardy. This factor operates "to take into account the extreme varia-
bility of factfinding functions." '283 Thus, "[i]n granting a license an
agency may sometimes appropriately rely on evidence which would not
279. Id. at 7 (emphasis added).
280. See text accompanying note 170 supra.
281. Id.
282. See text accompanying note 81 supra.
283. Residuum Rule, supra note 163, at 9.
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be considered as a basis for the revocation of the license. '284  In addi-
tion, procedural standards necessarily vary depending upon the func-
tions and goals of the agency involved.28 5 The only thing that can be
said about this factor is that it is quite often ignored-that it should
be so explains why agencies and courts are inclined to err so sublimely.
The fourth circumstantial consideration cuts both ways; that is, it has
its merits as well as its faults. First its merits should be considered.
On those fact-finding issues where "precision is not required, the most
practical method of proof may often be reliance on hearsay."288  The
same may be said of hearsay which is not adverse to the party-interest
threatened as well as those instances where, absent burden of proof
problems, both parties offer mere hearsay evidence. Somewhere along
the line the procedural practices must be kept in harmony with the
overall program budget. However, the last point raises a problem
often encountered; namely, should procedural guarantees give way to
economic considerations? Obviously the answer must depend upon the
importance of the particular procedure and whether or not its denial
will substantially jeopardize the interest (or right) threatened. Of
course, where economic urgencies are not present, liberal procedures
might be resorted to with greater frequency. However, conservation
of "fiscal and administrative resources" does not give an agency license
to ignore procedural due process; the governmental interests are quite
often not overriding.2 7  What is important is that "pragmatic consider-
ations" do not substantially interfere with the rights of the class of per-
sons the particular agency was meant to serve.288 To that extent, the
"economy of government" considerations should prevail.
The final consideration looks to the rationale of the hearsay rule in
order to determine whether the evidence should be deemed compe-
tent. It recognizes that "untested" assertions may prove erroneous on
cross-examination 28 9 since such assertions are generally inaccurate due
to "'faults in perception and memory.' "290 Professor Davis thus rea-
sons that where the facts are complicated and the probability of defi-
cient perception is "great, the lack of opportunity to cross-examine may
often be the key to the whole case."29' However, one might question
284. Id. at 7.
285. Id.
286. Id. at 10.
287. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 266 (1970); id. at 278 (Black, J., dissenting).
288. See note 121 supra.
289. Residuum Rule, supra note 163, at 11.
290. Id., quoting Morgan, Hearsay Dangers and the Application of the Hearsay
Concept, 62 HARV. L. 1Ev. 177, 186, 188 (1948).
291. Residuum Rule, supra note 163, at 11.
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whether the accuracy of an assertion relies exclusively upon the as-
sumed complexity of a given set of facts. Might it not be asserted that
there are some facts which standing alone are per se complicated?
Likewise, does the probability of the existence of a deficient perception
have to be "great" or merely "questionable" before it is necessary to
require cross-examination? The respective worth of the tests em-
ployed will, to some extent, be revealed by the answers they provide
to these questions.
Each of the five considerations, then, offer some reasonable criterion
of evaluation. Collectively, they seem to offer that "middle ground"
which neither statutory nor decisional law has been able to discover.
VII. SOME CONCLUDING THOUGHTS
Throughout the course of this Comment considerable attention has
been allotted to the various California procedures invoked in adminis-
trative hearings.292 Certain criticisms of the legal residuum rule have
been offered2 93 along with a few suggested considerations.294 Addi-
tionally, several due process issues have been entertained.2 5  A ques-
tion still remains, however, as to what is the best course of action to
follow as among the possible (and practical) alternatives. In making
this determination, one must be duly mindful of the considerations
heretofore presented. 296  Essentially, the following proposal sets out to
establish a point of procedural equilibrium whereby the interests of the
party adversely affected can be fairly balanced against the economic
and ministerial needs of the various agencies. Of course, this balanc-
ing of interests formula operates within the broader context of a pro-
tective presumption in favor of the party-interest so jeopardized.
It is suggested that the major flaw with the legal residuum rule as
it operates within the Walker and California statutory context is that
it introduces an over technical standard of evidentiary evaluation into
administrative proceedings. This it does despite the obvious absence
of a jury of laypersons.297 The problem encountered by introducing
292. See pts. II & III supra.
293. See pt. IV supra.
294. See pt. VI supra.
295. See pt. V supra.
296. See text accompanying notes 105-12 & 162-96 supra; text immediately following
notes 234 & 270 supra; note 274 supra; note 276 supra and accompanying text.
297. See ADmiNsTRATivE LAw Tax'T, supra note 1, at 277. Nevertheless, until such
time as an practical and equitable alternative is fashioned by the legislature, the courts,
or administrative agencies, the Walker rule may well be the only way to protect indi-
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the rules of evidence into administrative proceedings is that they tend
to burden unduly the very structure of the hearing by transforming it
into a judicial proceeding.29 8 The same basic criticism applies with
equal force to the invocation of the objection requirement.299  Addi-
tionally, the supplemental aspect of California Government Code sec-
tion 11513(c), 300 although appealing on its face, nevertheless, permits
otherwise weak direct evidence to be supported or supplemented by
potentially untrustworthy evidence. In such instances, the respective
worth of hearsay evidence does not become sufficient merely because
it is offered in conjunction with just any direct evidence no matter
how credible. The Code in effect recognizes the logic of the preceding
contention by providing for the sufficiency of uncorroborated hearsay
if "it would be admissible over objection in civil actions."301  Finally,
the "calculated to ascertain -the substantial rights of the parties" test
provided for in California Labor Code section 570802 allots too much
unnecessary discretion to administrative fiat. Its method of evaluation
hardly affords any reasonable standard to appraise the credibility of the
particular hearsay evidence relied upon.
In light of all of the foregoing remarks, it is proposed that a pro-
cedure be introduced which provides for: (1) the general admissi-
bility of all hearsay evidence; (2) an enunciation of specific classes of
uncorroborated hearsay evidence 0 3 which would be presumed to be
sufficient to sustain a finding unless overcome by contrary evidence suf-
ficient to create a reasonable doubt about the trustworthiness of the
evidence relied upon; (3) a presumption against the sufficiency of un-
corroborated hearsay not otherwise specifically enunciated as sufficient
unless the party offering such evidence overcomes the presumption by
introducing contrary evidence to assure the substantial trustworthiness
of the evidence offered. 4 Such a proposal would apply with equal
viduals against possible erroneous deprivations of vested rights. See text accompanying
notes 303-07 infra.
298. Of course, this criticism might not be applicable to those administrative proceed-
ings conducted by lawyers acting as referees and counsel. But see note 159 supra.
299. See text accompanying notes 105-11 supra.
300. See text accompanying notes 93 & 95 supra.
301. See text accompanying note 93 supra.
302. See note 125 supra.
303. See, e.g., note 126 supra.
304. The enforcement of this proposal should be influenced by the factors provided
for earlier. See text accompanying notes 105-12 & 162-96 supra; text immediately
following notes 235 & 270 supra; note 274 supra; note 276 supra and accompanying text.
Although it is beyond the scope of this Comment, it is suggested that the proposal
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force to the use of all uncorroborated hearsay.30 5 Regardless of wheth-
er the presumption operates in favor or against the evidence pre-
sented, full and adequate notice should be given to the party against
whom such evidence is introduced in order to put them on notice of
the possible consequences of reliance on such evidence and to afford
them an opportunity to obtain counsel in order to challenge the appli-
cable presumption. Unless specifically mandated by statutory or judicial
decree,80 6 the invocation of any subpoena powers would not be a pre-
requisite to challenging the sufficiency of uncorroborated hearsay evi-
dence otherwise presumed to be insufficient to sustain a finding.
07
Where, however, a party could overcome the presumption favoring
specified classes of uncorroborated hearsay evidence, in those in-
stances, a right to subpoena and thereafter cross-examine the adverse
hearsay declarant should issue.
Given the traditional tendency of lawmakers to fashion categorical
imperatives, along with the modern preoccupation with expediency, the
comments and proposals set forth above attempt to introduce into ad-
ministrative hearings the optimum degree of flexibility compatible with
the fair adjudication of party interests. Implicit in this formulation is
the recognition that no single rule can be absolute and equitable at the
same time, and that the "rights of the citizen" can be made "plain"
only where the overall tenor of the law lends itself to the particular
needs of the persons who stand before it.808
Ronald Kenneth Leo Collins
herein offered apply with equal force to hearsay evidence which is used in a supportive
or supplementary capacity. See text accompanying note 93 supra.
305. See, e.g., note 88 supra and accompanying text.
306. See note 116 supra and accompanying text.
307. Compare notes 112-21 supra and accompanying text. Of course, all subpoena
powers provided for by statute would be retained. See, e.g., CAL. Gov. CODE ANN. §
11190 (West 1966); CAL. WELF. & INST'VS CODE ANN. § 10954 (1972).
308. See generally B. CARDozo, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PaOCESS 161, 166
(1960); A. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS' 1163-64 (1952); J. DICKENSON,
ADMINISTRATIVE JUSTICE AND THE SUPREMACY OF LAW IN THE UNITED STATES 2 (1927);
J. FRANK, CoURTs ON TRIAL: MYTH AND REALITY IN AMERICAN JUsTIrc 190-221 (1963).
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